Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume Two
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 6 Specific Export Licence Applications After the Cease-Fire

Excerpt:
(XXI) MARCONI SECURE RADIO SYSTEMS: GR 083 ACT MOBILE DIGITAL RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

(XXI) MARCONI SECURE RADIO SYSTEMS: GR 083 ACT MOBILE DIGITAL RADIO COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

D6.455 In December 1989, the MODWG recommended the refusal on security grounds of an AWP application submitted by Marconi for the promotion and supply of the secure GR 083 mobile digital radio communications system, to the Salah-Al-Din Establishment in Iraq. The recommendation was approved at a meeting of the IDC on 13 December 1989:

“This equipment was refused on the grounds that it was sophisticated and might constitute a security risk. Marconi had already been instructed that they were not to market this equipment outside a very limited number of countries. The MOD would be writing to Marconi to ask why they had thought of selling the equipment to Iraq”. *862

D6.456 The export of this particular system was a matter with which the MODWG were familiar. *863 Two years earlier Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook (MOD/LSOR), in correspondence with DESS 2 had advised:

“Since 1985, the MODWG has adopted a firmer attitude towards the supply of strategic communications systems to Iran/Iraq and we believe that, Qif at all possible, the supply of GR 083 should be blocked as a significant enhancement”. *864

D6.457 The refusal was again raised at the IDC meeting held on 22 January 1990. The summary record stated “that the company might well appeal against the refusal (made on the grounds of sophistication and security risk).” *865

D6.458 In the course of discussion at the next MODWG meeting *866 an apparent inconsistency in the MOD approach was raised. A temporary ELA to export the GR 083 system (described on MODWG/IDC ‘lists’ as “Macrypux/Baseband units” *867) to Iraq, had been approved in October 1989 (as ‘insignificant’). Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook undertook to look into the matter and reconsider his security objection. *868

D6.459 In early February 1990, Mr Devlin (DESS 2a), by way of a reminder, sent a note to Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook. *869 He attached photocopies of both the approved temporary ELA and the refused AWP application and sought urgent advice. Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook replied the following day. *870 Citing the introduction to ‘a paper on communications in BAOR’ *871 he outlined the importance in modern warfare of digital radio communications systems, their development and advantages over previous technology. Expressing the LSOR view, he said that such systems constituted “major ‘force multipliers’” and as such, continued “to oppose the clearance of GR 083 (or PTARMIGAN, or TACNET etc) to Iraq (or Iran) on the grounds that it would very significantly enhance their capability to break the ceasefire by giving them a much more rapid centralised control over all their forces”. As to the prior approval of the temporary ELA, Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook accepted that it had resulted from the failure, on LSOR’s part, to properly identify and pick up the application. *872 DESO lodged a formal appeal at the next IDC meeting, on 19 March 1990. The note of that meeting recorded:

“DESO has appealed on behalf of the company against the recommendation that this equipment be refused on security and enhancement grounds. It was agreed that MOD and PUSD would discuss a recommendation which would be put forward at the next IDC for submission to Ministers”. *873

D6.460 On 5 April Lieut-Colonel D W Cook, a military expert attached to DESO, wrote to Lieut- Colonel Glazebrook. *874 He attached an extract from Marconi’s promotional literature and stated that the GR 083 ACT was Radio-Relay equipment and the equivalent of TRIFFID, not of PTARMIGAN.

D6.461 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook replied, on 10 April, *875 that his earlier note had been misread and his comparison of other, similar systems, misunderstood. He said that the systems were different but the basic equipment and deployment were the same. He attached a copy of the latest BDEC *876 entry which re-enforced LSOR’s standpoint:

“Sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq are governed by special Guidelines and, for IRAQ, we continue to refuse clearance for GR 083”.

D6.462 Lieut-Colonel Cook persisted with his argument in his letter of 17 April. *877 Referring back to the BDEC extract he wrote:

“...It is clear from the BDEC extract that you attached to Ref C that the Marconi area comms system is called CLAYMORE. The equipment that has to be added to GR 083 ACT to make it CLAYMORE and therefore comparable in capability to PTARMIGAN and TACNET is clearly listed.

2. I am sure you will agree the nearest in-service equivalent to the GR 083 ACT is TRIFFID which was the whole point of Ref A.”

D6.463 A copy of Lieut-Colonel Cook’s minute was passed on to Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook’s senior officer, Brigadier Moss (DOR Land 3). *878 On 24 April Brigadier Moss wrote to Lieut- Colonel Cook. *879 He said that he had been “somewhat surprised” to receive it, but having read it he accepted that there were some factual errors in Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook’s memo of 22 February. He said, however, that neither they, nor the security classification of the equipment, seriously affected the issue and continued:

"2. In declining to support sales of this equipment to IRAQ, LSOR 10c have faithfully applied the letter of the various Ministerial and committee directives that had been issued. These translate in to the fact that this particular radio relay equipment should not be on the shopping list.

3. I agree that in practice the interpretation of the rules is somewhat of a subjective process, I understand that the issues may be bought before the committee once again and I will arrange that LSOR8 support LSOR10c so that the matter is fairly reviewed with the appropriate technical expertise available.”

D6.464 The matter was raised at the next IDC meeting on 18 May. The summary record reads:

“178/38: GR 083 Iraq (Mobile Digital Radio Relay System).

(IDC recommendation: PENDING)

This equipment was approved in principle for Syria and Iraq in 1986. DESS will prepare a submission for their Ministers.” *880

D6.465 Mr Neale *881 (DESO), wrote to DESS 2 on 29 May (copied to members of the MODWG). He said:

“2. In fact, the recommendation to refuse the proposed sale on security grounds was flawed, in that the system in question is based on the Marconi GR 083 radio which is unclassified in the PV Grading Guide, is fairly old equipment (based on 1970s technology), and for which, I understand an “in principle” application for sale to Iraq was approved in 1986.

3. However, LSOR 10c(Sy) has also raised objections to the proposed sale on the grounds of enhancement, arguing that the equipment would give the Iraqis a better and more rapid centralised control over their forces, and therefore an improved ability to breach (if they chose to do so) the terms of the ceasefire. This, therefore, is the point which needs to be addressed in any new submission to Ministers.

4. An alternative view to that put forward by LSOR 10c(Sy) is that effective control of the armed forces and their weapon systems is essential to ensure that a ceasefire is maintained; and recent experience in Namibia, Sinai and other UN peacekeeping tasks around the world has demonstrated that the effective policing of a ceasefire is dependent on good communications. I also understand that the MSRS *882 system is intended to replace an existing French communications system, which itself has not been the cause of any significant breaches of the current ceasefire, even though a capability to control the weapons systems already exists.

5. The requirement is for an eventual total of 200 pairs of Land Rovers, each consisting of a switch vehicle and a single radio relay vehicle. It is, apparently, virtually impossible to manage a large communications system without some form of automated “network management” system; but, although MSRS have informed the potential customer that such a network management system would be required in connection with the deployment of more than 6 or 8 switches, the customer has not ordered any such system. The customer’s deployment plans are not known, but it does seem unlikely that he is proposing to set up large communication systems, but instead is likely to concentrate on a number of smaller systems.

6. In the circumstances, it is not considered that the provision of this equipment to the Iraqis would represent any significant enhancement of their capability to breach the terms of the ceasefire; and there would appear no reason, therefore, why Ministers should not now be recommended to approve this sale.... There is also the fact, of course, that MSRS were granted a Temporary Export Licence for the equipment last October!

7 Perhaps the Working Group might consider at their June meeting the modalities of a new submission to Ministers?” *883

D6.466 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook drafted a reply *884 which he put to Brigadier Moss on 8 June for comment. The draft said that no record could be found of any previous “approval in principle”, that the need for good communications to police the cease-fire did not require “the services of a bulk transmission system such as GR O83”, but that, on the other hand, “plans for a deliberate breach [of the ceasefire] do need such bulk transmission ‘facilities’ in order to send out the orders and make the preparations.” The draft expressed the view that “the replacement of the existing system by GR 083 would be of direct and significant assistance in the conduct of offensive operations in breach of the ceasefire by upgrading the Iraqi system with 200 pairs of switch vehicles and radio relay vehicles.” The language of revised guideline (iii) is to be noted. The draft reply went on to accept that the Iraqis had not ordered “a network management system” from Marconi, but noted that “12 months ago we drew attention to the Iraq system of disguising their intentions by ordering different components from different countries.” This was a reference by Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook to the paper on Iraqi procurement. *885 In fact, at least one of the pieces of equipment necessary to convert the GR 083 into an “area communication system” had already been sent to Iraq under the Temporary ELA granted in October 1989.

D6.467 In late June, before the draft reply could be finalised, the Defence Attache in Baghdad telexed DESO. *886 Marconi’s Regional Sales Manager had paid him a visit and advised that the Iraqis had delayed the granting of a contract for one year, without explanation. This information was drawn to the attention of the MODWG and the ‘pending AWP list’ duly annotated. The matter was not pursued any further and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait soon intervened.

Endnotes:

*862 - FCO/6.1.2 at 4, paragraph 1(viii)

*863 - See paragraph D2.46 supra

*864 - MOD/13.2.253 at 255

*865 - FCO/6.4.196 at 201

*866 - MOD/31.2.7 and MOD/31.2.117

*867 - MOD/30.2.51

*868 - Written evidence of J Hextall dated 17 November 1993, paragraph a).

*869 - MOD/31.2.117

*870 - MOD/31.2.127

*871 - British Army of the Rhine

*872 - See also, oral evidence of Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook, Day 5, p. 72, line 5.

*873 - FCO/6.4.117 at 120, paragraph 1(x)

*874 - MOD/32.1.89

*875 - MOD/32.1.135

*876 - British Defence Equipment Catalogue

*877 - MOD/32.1.175

*878 - See transcript of Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook’s oral evidence Day 5, 12 May 1993, p.96: “DESO have a tendency, if they do not get the answer they like from me, to raise it to my superiors in the hope that they will be kinder”.

*879 - MOD/32.1.215

*880 - FCO/6.4.2 at 7, paragraph 1(xix)

881 - See transcript of oral evidence of Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook Day 5, p. 82. Mr Neale was not an expert on military signals and Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook believed that Lieut-Colonel Cook had had a hand in drafting the letter.

*882 - Marconi Secure Radio Systems

*883 - MOD/32.1.451

*884 - MOD/32.2.117

*885 - see paragraphs D5.66 to D5.79 supra

*886 - MOD/32.2.345

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.