Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume Two
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 6 Specific Export Licence Applications After the Cease-Fire

Excerpt:
(XVIII) PLESSEY RADAR LIMITED: RADAR JAMMER

(XVIII) PLESSEY RADAR LIMITED: RADAR JAMMER

D6.428 In February 1989 Plessey Radar Limited (Plessey) submitted an AWP clearance application in respect of an S500 Ground-to-Ground ESM/ECM Radar Jammer and an Electronic Warfare Command Centre (EWCC) which it proposed to promote and supply to the Iraqi Air Force. The ESM (Electronic Support Measures) receiving system was designed to detect, locate and analyse the characteristics of enemy radars. Using the information obtained by the ESM system, the ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) facility could then be used to jam the radars rendering them unable to detect an offensive operation. *821 The AWP application was considered by the MODWG on 8 February 1989. *822 They recommended refusal on both “security” and “enhancement” grounds. *823 The MODWG’s recommendation was accepted at a meeting of the IDC on 23 March 1989. The application was refused.

D6.429 In a letter to Miss Crown (MOD/DESO) dated 7 July 1989 Plessey requested that reconsideration be given to the decision not to grant “clearance to promote the.... equipment”. *824 It had not been clear from the original AWP application that Plessey had been seeking clearance merely to promote. The MODWG and the IDC had considered the application as a proposal to supply. The application was duly reconsidered at a meeting of the MODWG on 24 August 1989. Despite Plessey’s assurance that they wished merely to promote the Radar Jammer it was dealt with by the MODWG as a proposal to supply. It is not entirely clear from the documents which I have seen on what basis the decision was taken to discount Plessey’s assurance. However, given that Plessey had indicated on the AWP application that: “They [the customers] have expressed a strong desire to make the existing contract effective and to upgrade to the S500 specification”, it may well be that the MODWG considered that Plessey’s promotional efforts had already been successful and that supply was likely to follow AWP clearance. The MODWG again recommended refusal on security and enhancement grounds. Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook’s manuscript note on the MODWG list records “R(Sy) and (Enh) but appeal likely”. *825 The MODWG recommendation was accepted at a meeting of the IDC on 1 September 1989.

D6.430 On 7 February 1990, in a letter to Mr Haddow (DESO/RMD), Plessey again “appealed” against the IDC decision. *826 They provided the following grounds in support of the appeal:

(a) that the equipment was a “relatively basic training system”;

(b) that the “Air Force does not maintain ground based offensive systems and wishes to use the S500 to train their defence radar operators”;

(c) that in the unlikely event that the S500 was “used offensively by the Army the quantities are insufficient to have any effect”;

(d) that the technology used in the S500 was “unclassified”.

The appeal was restricted to the S500 Radar Jammer. Plessey stated that “The EWCC was included to cover the possibility that we may in the future wish to promote operational EW equipment to the Iraqi Army. This currently is not our desire and therefore in the draft application it has been removed”. A new AWP application was therefore submitted which solely covered the S500 Radar Jammer.

D6.431 In a minute dated 6 April 1990 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook (MOD/LSOR) recommended refusal of the Plessey application on both security and significant enhancement grounds. *827 He rejected the arguments put forward by Plessey on the following bases:

“(a) In our view it is of a standard which makes it entirely suitable for operational use.

(b) It can be used for training (as can 99% of military equipment), however, if you look at Plessey’s own brochure.... you will see that its training capability is the last of its attributes.

(c) This is because you do not need the ESM equipment if you are going to use it only for jamming training....

(3) Plesseys claim that 12 is an insignificant quantity is nonsense. If Iraq intended to deliberately breach the cease-fire, this quantity is more than sufficient to cover the area at which the attack would take place and would significantly enhance the chances of success by jamming Iranian radars in that area....”

D6.432 In a letter to Mr Barrett dated 22 June 1990, copied to Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook, Mr Neale (DESO) requested that “urgent attention [be given] to the application so that I can respond positively to Siemens Plessey”. *828 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook responded in a minute dated 26 June 1990. He recommended refusal on security and enhancement grounds and repeated the reasons given in his 6 April minute. *829 On 17 July 1990 Mr Neale, having considered Lieut- Colonel Glazebrook’s recommendation, said: “I believe that this recommendation ought not to go unchallenged, and that the matter deserves further consideration by the MOD Working Group.... I cannot see how we can argue that the supply of this equipment would be against either the letter or the spirit of the current Guidelines”. *830 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook maintained his objection to the AWP and it was reconsidered at a meeting of the MODWG on 19 July 1990. *831 The MODWG decided that the application should remain “Pending” to enable it to be further considered by LSOR, DIS and DESO.