Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume Two
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 6 Specific Export Licence Applications After the Cease-Fire Document

Excerpt:
(XIV) PD TECHNICAL MOULDINGS LIMITED

(XIV) PD TECHNICAL MOULDINGS LIMITED

The Application for AWP Clearance

D6.359 In March 1990 PD Technical Mouldings Limited (PD Technical Mouldings) applied for AWP clearance in relation to “Pipe Fascine Narrow Gap Bridging Equipment”. *674 Two applications were made so that the equipment could be promoted in Iraq and Iran. The applications were included in the lists of AWP applications for consideration by the MODWG at its next meeting of 11 April 1990. The lists were distributed to members of the MODWG on 3 April 1990. *675

D6.360 The Pipe Fascine Narrow Gap Bridging Equipment is a system which “enables tanks to cross narrow gaps such as trenches.” *676 On 11 April 1990 the AWP application was assessed by the MODWG as “R(Sy/ENH)”. *677 Mr Hextall stated in his written evidence to the Inquiry that the MODWG recommendation was to refuse the application on both “security and enhancement grounds”. *678

D6.361 The MODWG recommendation was discussed at the IDC meeting on 19 April 1990 and the IDC agreed to recommend refusal. *679 The recommendations of the IDC were put up to the Minister (DP) by way of a submission dated 15 May 1990 from Mr Barrett. *680 Mr Barrett requested in the submission that the Minister (DP) take particular note of, inter alia, the application by PD Technical Mouldings for AWP clearance for Iran. The submission stated at paragraph 2d:

“the MODWG viewed this to be a system for offensive use which would be particularly well suited for use by forces advancing rapidly across the sort of terrain which separates the two sides in the Gulf conflict. The IDC agreed to recommend refusal both of this application for Iran and that for Iraq”.

It may fairly be inferred from the reference in the submission to “offensive use” that, in invoking enhancement as a ground of refusal, the MODWG was applying the revised form of guideline (iii) which called for refusal of an application which would be of direct and significant assistance to either country in the conduct of offensive operations in breach of the cease-fire. The submission also requested that the Minister (DP), Mr Clark, endorse the IDC’s recommendations.

D6.362 In a minute dated 22 May 1990 from the APS to the Minister (DP) to Mr Barrett, the APS said that “Mr Clark does not... regard the proposal as a significant enhancement and is therefore not prepared to endorse your recommendation”. *681 In his written evidence to the Inquiry Mr Clark described the equipment as being “an extremely primitive system, which was first developed in World War I”. *682 He went on to explain that “There are many different ways in which tanks can now be enabled to ‘cross narrow gaps such as trenches’, and by no stretch of the imagination could this possibly be regarded as a significant enhancement”.

D6.363 Mr Barrett said in his written evidence that he did not know “the basis on which Mr Clark reached his view”. *683 Similarly Mr Hextall said in his written evidence that he was not aware of the background to Minister (DP)’s decision to overrule the recommendation. *684

D6.364 Ministers, when asked to take export licensing decisions, are entitled to reject officials’ advice in appropriate cases. If Mr Clark considered that the export of the equipment would not amount to significant enhancement, he was entitled to support the export accordingly. He should not, however, have overridden the advice of his MOD experts without good reason. The equipment may indeed have been “an extremely primitive system” but this did not necessarily mean that it would not have constituted a significant enhancement within the meaning of Guideline (iii). Mr Clark’s reference in evidence to the Inquiry to the fact that “there are many ways” in which tanks can now be enabled to “cross narrow gaps such as trenches” suggests that he may not have addressed his mind to the question which, in my view, he should have considered. The question was not whether there were many different ways for tanks to cross narrow gaps, such as trenches; rather the question was whether the acquisition by Iraq of pipe fascine narrow gap bridging equipment at that time would, having regard to the equipment then available to its forces, constitute a significant enhancement.

D6.365 The minute from the APS to the Minister (DP) to Mr Barrett was copied to Mr Hextall who wrote a note in manuscript on it to “Mr D” requesting that the application be added back to the list showing that it had been “Approved by MOD Mins”. *685 I have drawn the inference that “Mr D” is Mr Devlin who was DESS2a at that time. The decision of Mr Clark was reported to the MODWG by way of the next updated list of applications, circulated under cover of a minute dated 8 June 1990 by Mr Devlin, for consideration at the MODWG’s next meeting on 14 June. *686 The list recorded the decision of Mr Clark by the annotation “Approved by MOD Mins”. In his written evidence to the Inquiry Mr Hextall recalled that Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook had asked at the MODWG meeting for “the remark against this case to be amended to reflect the fact it was Minister (DP) alone and not ‘MOD Ministers’ who had approved it.”*687 The remark of Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook was added to the lists after that meeting and was reflected in the lists sent to the IDC for its meeting on 22 June 1990. *688 Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook had also made a manuscript note on his copy of the lists next to the PD Technical Mouldings AWP application for Iraq recording that he would “Query Min AF” *689 and this was reflected in the lists sent forward to the IDC.

D6.366 The next MODWG meeting was held on 19 July 1990. Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook annotated his list of applications by stating “NESO under protest”. *690 In his written evidence Mr Hextall recalled that Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook “withdrew his objection and explained that ‘NESO under protest’ was an abbreviation for ”no equipment security objection under protest”. *691 Mr Barrett recorded in his written evidence that he was not aware that Lieut- Colonel Glazebrook had referred the matter to Minister (AF). He added “Nor did I think there was a case for doing so, because there were no security or operational grounds for refusal.” *692 This statement is, as it stands, inconsistent with the advice contained in Mr Barrett’s earlier submission to Minister (DP) recording the recommendation of the MODWG and IDC that the application should be refused on enhancement and security grounds. However, there is no evidence or suggestion that Mr Barrett acted at any time in a manner inconsistent with the MODWG recommendation.

D6.367 The recommendations of the MODWG were discussed at the next IDC meeting on 26 July 1990. The summary record of the meeting dated 31 July 1990 recorded the following in respect of the application of PD Technical Mouldings:

“(vii) (Page D1-1)(173/38) Iran-: PD Technical Mouldings - Pipe Fascine Narrow Gap Bridging Equipment (IDC Recommendation: APPROVAL)

The IDC recommended approval of this equipment for demonstration purposes only. MOD Ministers have decided that there are no grounds for refusal on enhancement grounds, unless the equipment is supplied in large quantities”. *693

The summary record only refers to the application for Iran. However the IDC meeting of 26 July 1990 was prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and it may be assumed that the recommendation was intended also to apply to Iraq.

D6.368 Neither the summary record nor any other papers submitted to the Inquiry explain the basis for the assertion that MOD Ministers had decided that there were no grounds for refusal of the application “unless the equipment is supplied in large quantities.” Mr Clark explained in his written evidence to the Inquiry that he considered that the equipment was “an extremely primitive system” and could not on that basis be regarded as a significant enhancement. *694 There is, in my view, an unexplained inconsistency between the summary record and Mr Clark’s evidence as to the basis on which he overruled the recommendation of the IDC and MODWG.

D6.369 After the IDC meeting of 26 July 1990 the PD Technical Mouldings applications ceased to appear on the pending lists at the meetings of the IDC and MODWG and, as far as Mr Hextall is aware, no reply was given to PD Technical Mouldings before the UN embargo in Iraq was introduced in August 1990. *695

Endnotes:

*674 - MOD/32.1.9 at 25 and 27

*675 - MOD/32.1.9

-676 - MOD/32.1.383 at 385

*677 - MOD/32.1.141 at 159 ie Refusal on Security and on enhancement of military capability grounds.

*678 - Mr Hextall’s written statement of 1 November 1993 Section N-2

*679 - MOD/32.1.383 at 391 and 393

*680 - MOD/32.1.383

*681 - MOD/32.1.395

*682 - Mr Clark’s written statement dated 17 and 18 November 1993, paragraph N.4.2

*683 - Mr Barrett’s written statement dated 27 October 1993, paragraph N.4.2

*684 - Mr Hextall’s written statement dated 1 November 1993, Section N-2

*685 - MOD/32.1.395

*686 - MOD/32.2.41

*687 - Mr Hextall’s written statement dated 1 November 1993, Section N-2

*688 - MOD/32.2.191 at 215

*689 - MOD/32.2.41 at 81

*690 - MOD/32.3.167 at 201

*691 - Mr Hextall’s written statement dated 1 November 1993 N-2

*692 - Mr Barrett’s written statement dated 27 October 1993 paragraph N.4.3

*693 - DTI/157.4.14559 at 14560

* 694 - Mr Clark’s written statement dated 17 and 18 November 1993, paragraph N.4.2

*695 - Mr Hextall’s written statement of 1 November 1993 Section N-2

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.