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Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*


Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of the Guidelines in the period December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY ON EXPORTS TO IRAQ


D2.419 In the period preceding the adoption of the Howe Guidelines, public statements on government policy towards exports of defence-related equipment to Iran and Iraq had stressed that the policy was one of neutrality in the conflict and that no “lethal” equipment was supplied to either of the combatants. A typical statement is the answer which Mr Channon gave on 11 June 1984 to a PQ from Mr David Howell MP: “Applications for licences covering the export to [Iran and Iraq] of goods controlled under the [EG(C)O] are carefully scrutinised to ensure that, in accordance with Her Majesty’s Government’s policy of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq conflict, no lethal equipment is supplied.” *611 And Lord Howe prefaced his announcement of the Guidelines on 29 October 1985 by saying that the UK had “been strictly impartial in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and [had] refused to allow the supply of lethal defence equipment to either side.”

D2.420 One of the main reasons for the adoption of the Guidelines was the difficulty of satisfactorily defining what was covered by the bar on “lethal” supplies. So, after the announcement of the Guidelines on 29 October 1985, it is not surprising that statements of Government policy tended to rely on the Guidelines. But, nonetheless, reference to the Guidelines was usually accompanied by a reference to “neutrality”, “impartiality” or the like.

D2.421 An early example can be found in the letter dated 2 December 1985 sent by Mr Renton to Mr Richard Luce, a constituent of whom had criticised exports to Iran of spare parts for military vehicles. The substance of Mr Renton’s letter is contained in its second paragraph: “The Government has adopted a position of strict impartiality in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. All applications for the supply of defence equipment are rigorously scrutinised to ensure that nothing is provided which might significantly enhance the capacity of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. The detailed guidelines governing the release of defence equipment were set out in Geoffrey Howe’s written reply to David Steel on 29 October.” Mr Renton ended his letter by giving the assurance “that we shall continue to scrutinise all applications to export defence equipment to see that they conform to the guidelines ....” *612

D2.422 Lord Howe’s statement on 29 October 1985 had referred to “defence equipment”. In internal memoranda as well as in public statements the expressions “defence equipment” and “defence-related equipment” were used interchangeably and both were used in the context of “arms” sales. Thus in a briefing paper by MOD/DESS2 for the purposes of a debate in the House of Lords, under the heading “What is British policy on arms sales to Iran or Iraq?”, the text reads “The export of defence-related equipment from the United Kingdom to Iran and Iraq is subject to very strict Government Guidelines. We will not allow the sale of anything which could significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict.” *613

D2.423 Similarly, in a draft letter prepared in December 1986 by FCO/MED, there is, first, a reference to the Government’s policy of impartiality between Iran and Iraq, second, a statement that “The Government’s policy on the sale of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq is a direct result of this declared impartiality” and, third, a reference to the Guidelines which “specifically prohibit the sale of any defence-related equipment to either Iran or Iraq that could significantly enhance ...” *614

D2.424 In an answer to a PQ in the House of Commons on 21 January 1987, Mr Renton said that the Guidelines had “proved effective in implementing our policy of strict impartiality in the Iran-Iraq conflict and of not supporting the war making capabilities of either side.” *615 In the Debate on the Address on 14 November 1986, Mr Renton had described Government policy as being “scrupulously impartial.” *616 Mr Mellor, who replaced Mr Renton as Minister of State at the FCO in June 1987, said, in answer to a PQ from Mr Parry MP on 2 July 1987, that: “As a direct result of our impartiality in the conflict, we prohibit the export to either Iran or Iraq of defence-related equipment that could significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict.” *617 It would not, I believe, have occurred to Mr Mellor that by his reference to “defence-related equipment” he was expanding the ambit of the Guidelines beyond the “defence equipment” to which Lord Howe had referred on 29 October 1985. Lord Howe himself, in a letter dated 6 November 1987 to Sir Ian Lloyd MP, referred to “defence-related” exports as being the subject of the “very strict controls.” *618

D2.425 In a letter dated 5 May 1987 to Mr Robert McCrindle MP, Mr Renton referred to “our defence sales policy” and said “Essentially, we prohibit the sale of any defence-related equipment to either Iran or Iraq that could significantly enhance the capability ...” etc. and added that “The Guidelines are rigidly enforced through an export licence regime.” *619 Several other letters contain like references to the Guidelines being “rigidly enforced.” *620 If the emphasis placed at the time of formulation of the Guidelines, and subsequently, on the merit of flexibility is borne in mind, the repeated use of the adverb “rigidly” was, perhaps, unfortunate.

D2.426 Finally, I should refer to a letter dated 10 May 1988 from Lord Trefgarne to Lord Kilbracken in which Lord Trefgarne said that “we have been strictly impartial in the conflict and have refused to supply lethal equipment and any defence equipment which, in our view, could significantly enhance ...” etc. *621

 

Endnotes:

*611 - see House of Commons Hansard: 11 June 1984, Col.332

*612 - see FCO/2.1.3

*613 - see FCO/2.1.67

*614 - see FCO/2.1.95/6. This draft became a background paper sent to a number of MPs see pp.97 to 113

*615 - see House of Commons Hansard: 21 January 1987, Col 606

*616 - see House of Commons Hansard: 14 November 1986, Col 279

*617 - see House of Commons Hansard: 2 July 1987, Col 157

*618 - see FCO/2.2.2. See also references to “defence-related” equipment at FCO/2.2.11, FCO/2.2.20, FCO/2.2.28, FCO/2.2.46, FCO/2.2.58 and FCO/2.2.67

*619 - see FCO/2.2.106 - 107

*620 - see FCO/2.2.58, FCO/2.2.135, FCO/2.2.185, FCO/2.2.194, FCO/2.2.198, FCO/2.2.207, FCO/2.2.212, FCO/2.2.217, FCO/2.2.227, FCO/2.2.237, FCO/2.2.256, and FCO/2.2.262

*621 - see MOD/16.97

 

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.

 

 

 


 

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