Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
Specific Cases - (xxi) Quickfire Artillery Fire Control System

D2.411 On 20 May 1985 a letter was sent from the Middle East Department of the FCO to Sec (D Sales) at the MOD attaching a list of outstanding ELAs and AWPs for Iraq. The letter requested that the MODWG consider the outstanding applications so that “these applications can be looked at at the next meeting of the [IDC]”. *593 The list included an application by Marconi Command and Control Systems Ltd (MCCS) for AWP clearance in relation to Quickfire Artillery Fire Control Systems (Quickfire). The list included a comment that the application for AWP clearance of Quickfire had “Previously [been] refused (August 1984)”. *594

D2.412 Quickfire is a computer system used to calculate the settings to be applied to an artillery gun in order to strike a particular target. MCCS describe it as a “lightweight, high capability artillery fire control system for use at battery or battalion level. It is a modular system, having common hardware modules at observer post, command post and at the weapons. It also interfaces with any line or combat net radio system including frequency hoppers.” *595

D2.413 On 19 June 1985 a minute was circulated to MODWG members attaching a list of ELAs and AWPs to be considered at the MODWG meeting to be held the next day, 20 June 1985. The list included two applications by MCCS for AWP clearance in relation to Quickfire for export to Iraq. The first was the application that had been previously refused but had been renewed. The second was a multiple application of 31 August 1984. At the meeting on 20 June 1985 the MODWG made the recommendation “A - Promotion only” for both applications. *596

D2.414 The recommendations of the MODWG were discussed and adopted at the IDC meeting on 27 June. The IDC agreed to recommend “A - Promotion only”. 597 A summary record of the meeting also noted that:

“Supply after the Conflict

8. As agreed at the last IDC meeting [9 May], MOD had produced a form of words which could be used to guide companies in this matter. The proposed wording was as follows:

Whilst the Government is not prepared to grant preliminary clearance to supply/an export licence while hostilities continue, it will of course be prepared to reconsider the possibility of supply following the formal cessation of hostilities.

FCO indicated that they had consulted their Legal Advisers and had no objection to the proposed wording. The DTI had not had time to consider the wording but agreed to inform other members of the Committee of their view before the next meeting.” *598

The reference to the “proposed wording” produced by MOD was a reference to a letter dated 26 June 1985 which Mr Lavender (MOD) had written to Mr Collins (MED/FCO). The letter explained that, following the previous IDC meeting of 9 May at which it had been agreed that “UK companies should where possible not be discouraged from continuing to promote their equipment with a view to possible supply after the end of hostilities”, he had been “tasked with drafting a form of words”. *599 Mr Lavender went on to comment that the wording was proposed “In order to hold out some hope of a review at the end of hostilities for those AWP and export licence applications which [were then] being refused.” The minute was copied to “those concerned in MOD and to DTI (ELB)”. The DTI responded to the letter of 26 July by a letter dated 8 August 1985 addressed to Mr Collins (MED) and copied to Mr Lavender. The DTI suggested “a more general statement would be useful” to cover the situation where companies sought “preliminary advice about supplying military type equipment to Iran and Iraq”. *600 The suggested general statement said the following:

“Her Majesty’s Government’s position is one of impartiality in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. As part of this policy, HMG does not permit the supply of goods to either country which would significantly enhance their capability to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. Applications for Export Licences are considered according to these criteria. HMG will of course be prepared to reconsider the possibility of supply of such goods following the formal cessation of hostilities and you may therefore wish to continue to promote your equipment in these markets.”

The wording was subsequently approved by the FCO and MOD as a suitable reply to general enquiries on sales to Iraq. *601

D2.415 The recommendations of the IDC were formally put up to the Minister (DP) by way of a submission from Mr Lavender dated 24 July 1985. *602 The submission attached the list of ELAs and AWPs which included the two applications by MCCS for AWP clearance for Iraq. *603 The list also noted that the FCO had approved the two applications.

D2.416 On 29 July 1985 Mr Lavender held a meeting with Minister (DP), Mr Butler, to discuss the IDC recommendations. In a minute to Mr Dawson, Mr Hextall and Mr Taylor dated 30 July, Mr Lavender stated that “At my meeting with Minister (DP) last night, he said that he was not disposed to intervene in the approval given in the latest list dated 24 July.” *604

APPLICATION FOR AWP CLEARANCE DATED 13 AUGUST 1986

D2.417 On 13 August 1986 MCCS made a further application for AWP clearance with a view to supplying Quickfire to Iraq. The application was added to the list of AWP applications to be considered by the MODWG at its next meeting of 11 September 1986. The lists were distributed on 8 September to the members of the MODWG. *605

D2.418 On 11 September the application was assessed by the MODWG as being ‘A(I)’. The MODWG recommended, however, that AWP clearance be given for ‘P&S’, i.e. both promotion and supply of Quickfire, but remarked “promotion only, no supply before end of hostilities”. *606 The recommendations of the MODWG were discussed and adopted at the IDC meeting on 18 September 1986. *607 The MODWG remark remained annotated on the list of AWP applications *608 This suggests that the AWP clearance was given for promotional purposes only and that supply would not be allowed whilst the hostilities continued between Iran and Iraq. The MODWG and IDC considered that supply of Quickfire to Iraq would be in breach of Guideline (iii) which called for refusal of an application which would significantly enhance the capability of either Iraq or Iran to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. The recommendations of the IDC were formally put up to the Minister (DP) by way of a submission dated 23 September 1986 from Mr Jones (DESS2) attaching the list of applications. *609 In a minute dated 8 October 1986 to Mr Jones, the APS to the Minister (DP) stated that Lord Trefgarne (who had now become the Minister (DP)) was “content with the recommendations attached to your minute”. *610

Endnotes
*593 - MOD/8.2.15

*594 - MOD/8.2.15 at 17. Neither the DTI nor the MOD have been able to find out the reason for the previous refusal

*595 - MOD/1245

*596 - MOD/8.2.181 at 188

*597 - MOD/8.2.219 and 225

*598 - MOD/8.2.195 at 197

*599 - MOD/8.2.189

*600 - MOD/8.2.303

*601 - DTI/39(A1).1799 and MOD/8.2.423

*602 - MOD/8.2.219

*603 - MOD/8.2.219 at 225

*604 - MOD/8.2.249; MOD/8.2.311; see also paragraph D1.124 supra

*605 - MOD/9.5.149 at 165

*606 - MOD/9.5.255 and 273

*607 - MOD/10.1.9 at 27

*608 - MOD/10.1.9 at 27

*609 - MOD/10.1.9

*610 - MOD/10.1.245

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.