Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
PUBLICITY

D2.30 The conduct of policy regarding defence sales to Iran and Iraq during the period under review was accompanied by consistent endeavours on the part of officials and Ministers to prevent being made public information that might lead to critical public debate about export licensing decisions.

D2.31 IMS acted as consultants in connection with the construction of the Iraqi’s Integrated Weapons Complex (IWC) at Basra, and, with the approval of the MOD, made arrangements under which two senior Iraqi Naval Officers would receive training in England and be shown the comparable equipment in operation at the IWC at Gosport. In a letter dated 25 April 1986 to Mr Keeling (ARMD, DESO) about these arrangements Mr Peter Rooney of IMS said that he was “conscious of the need for a low profile in this exercise and the Iraqi officers will be designated as Civilian Government Servants during their stay in the UK.” *47

D2.32 In regard to the release to Iran of the Yarrow ships and the sale of components to be used as spares for the two ships, the MOD warned the Yarrow shipyard that “It is also important... to ensure that no publicity is given either to the departure of the ships themselves or of these components, and I would be grateful if you would do all you can to prevent publicity.” *48 And in a Note dated 27 March 1985 to Mr Butler, Mr Luce said that “It is important that no publicity is given to the departure of the Yarrow ships or to the release of the additional components.” *49

D2.33 In a letter dated 10 October 1986 from an official in DESO to the chief executive of a company desiring to sell static air defence radar to Iran, paragraph 5 said that “It is the wish of the British Government that there should be no publicity about this sale, should it in the event proceed.” *50

D2.34 In a briefing for Mr Clark’s meeting with the Machine Tool Trades Association (MTTA) *51 on 20 January 1988 for the purpose of discussing exports of machine tools known to the government to be intended for the manufacture of munitions, Mr Steadman, the then head of ELB, recommended that Mr Clark should advise the MTTA and the manufacturers to “maintain a low profile. Press or public attention would make it more difficult to permit fulfilment of contracts.” *52 The briefing was approved by Mr Beston, head of OT2/3. The DTI Note of the meeting itself records Mr Clark as agreeing that “inflammatory press comment would be unhelpful at this time.” *53

D2.35 In a submission dated 28 January 1988 to senior FCO officials, Mr Patey (MED) recommended that licences allowing the export to Iraq of the machine tools should not be revoked. In a manuscript Note on the submission, Mr Blackley, Assistant Head of MED, said that “... if it becomes public knowledge that the tools are to be used to make munitions deliveries will have to stop at once ...” and that “... [the companies] must ... renounce publicity and lobbying for their own good.” *54 This comment is revealing in the light it casts on FCO attitudes to publicity. It accepts, explicitly, that public pressure may cause the reversal of an administrative decision (presumably a decision believed to be a correct one) and, implicitly, that that possibility is a good reason for knowledge being withheld from the public. *55

D2.36 And, finally, in a Note dated 15 July 1988 to DESS2 relating to the provision by Tripod Engineering Ltd of an Aviation Medical Centre for the Iraqi Air Force and to advice which had been given by the Commandant of the RAF’s Institute of Aviation Medicine, Lord Trefgarne’s Assistant Private Secretary said that “it should be suggested gently to Tripod Engineering that the involvement of the IAM should not be given any publicity.” *56 A Note by Mr Hextall (DESS2a) to Miss G Johnson (RM2a in DESO) informed her that Tripod was to be advised that the involvement of the IAM should not be given any publicity and then continued: “...this would probably be best achieved by suggesting to Tripod that it would clearly be in their best interests to play down the military aspects of their contract, and that it would therefore be wise to ensure that no publicity is given to the IAM’s involvement.”

Endnotes
*47 - see MOD/9.3.87

*48 - see the letter dated 29 March 1985 from the Private Secretary of the Head of Defence Sales to the chief executive of Yarrow Ship Builders Ltd. MOD/10.2.307

*49 - see MOD/10.2.309

*50 - see MOD/11.2.152

*51 - The actual title of the MTTA is the ‘Machine Tool Technologies Association’ but it is commonly referred to as the ‘Machine Tool Trades Association’ and will be referred to as such in this Report

*52 - see DTI/58.4887

*53 - see DTI/58.4890 at paragraph 7

*54 - see FCO/23.2.129

*55 - see Mr Blackley’s explanation and justification of his comment in his oral evidence, Day 20, 27 July 1993, pp 128 to 140

* 56 - see MOD/15.3.147 at paragraph 2(d)

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.