Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
THE VISIT TO LONDON OF TARIQ AZIZ

D2.3 In December 1985 Mr Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to London. He made a call on the Prime Minister on 4 December 1985. The FCO briefing for the Prime Minister warned that one of his objectives would be: “To get HMG to agree to a total ban on defence sales to Iran”. The briefing suggested that the Prime Minister might make in response the following points: “UK defence supplies to Iran minimal. Strictly controlled. Do not enhance Iranian military capability. No equipment to either side which might prolong or exacerbate the conflict. UK policy poses no threat to Iraq, which is extremely well armed (in part by ourselves) but bears heavily on Iran.” The briefing gave (inter alia) the following “Background” details: “Iraq is constantly seeking to put UK on spot about defence sales to Iran, particularly on small number of contracts recently fulfilled e.g. vehicle spares supplied under old contracts. Their wilder claims (boats, helicopter plants etc.) are nonsense. UK support for Iraq is implicit in quantity of defence equipment supplied to Iraq since war began in 1980; and in presence of one hundred Iraqis who attended military training courses in the UK last year. Pilots, aero-nautical engineers also being trained.” *3

D2.4 A letter dated 4 December 1985 reporting on the meeting was sent by Sir Charles Powell (as he later became), the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, to the FCO, with copies to the MOD and the DTI. The letter recorded that the Prime Minister had said to Mr Tariq Aziz that “we had terminated the supply of weapons to Iran and even the supply of items which might possibly have a military application.” *4 This statement of the position regarding defence supplies to Iran went a good deal further than the Guidelines or the approvals of defence supplies to Iran currently being given in fact justified. It went a good deal further than the briefing to the Prime Minister had gone. The statement was discussed at the IDC meeting held on 10 December 1985. The Summary Record records the discussion as follows:

“There was some discussion as to how this [i.e. the Prime Minister’s statement to Mr Tariq Aziz] might effect the Ministerial Guidelines. It was concluded that the guidelines were the prime source of policy on defence sales to Iran and Iraq and that the Prime Minister’s comments as reported in the Private Secretary’s letter, were compatible with these Guidelines. However, the IDC took the view that the Prime Minister’s comments meant that the IDC should err on the side of strictness when deciding on cases where the evidence by itself was inconclusive.” *5

D2.5 It is difficult to follow how the Prime Minister’s statement could have been regarded as compatible either with guideline (ii) or with guideline (iii), each of which contemplated that some supplies would continue to be approved. In circumstances, however, in which Iraq was holding a number of British prisoners, a matter to which attention had been, rightly, paid in the briefing to the Prime Minister, I do not think that criticism can be directed at the Prime Minister if, in her remarks to Mr Tariq Aziz about British defence sales to Iran, she was guilty of gilding the lily. However, in a Note dated 20 December 1985 to other FCO officials, Mr Egerton agreed “with the IDC’s view that they should err on the side of strictness in interpreting the Iran/Iraq arms sales guidelines of 4 December 1984”. He added the comment that “this will in due course give rise to agonised shouts of foul play from suppliers, who will attack the interpretation strongly through Mr Lamont.” *6 Mr Lamont had become the Minister (DP).

D2.6 The Minister of State at the FCO, Mr Renton, after reading Mr Collins’ Note of 19 December 1985 and Mr Egerton’s of 20 December, said that he “endorse[d] the view that the IDC should err on the side of strictness in interpreting the 4 December 1984 Guidelines.” *7

D2.7 It may be doubted whether the Prime Minister had in fact intended her remarks to Mr Tariq Aziz to be taken up by the IDC in the way they were. Be that as it may, her remarks were taken, at least by the FCO, as justifying a strict interpretation of the Guidelines, i.e. a refusal of export licences in any “grey area” cases. It may not be irrelevant to recall that the FCO had favoured, in the discussions leading up to the Guidelines, a policy that might have led to the virtual cessation of all defence supplies to either country.

D2.8 There had been a previous occasion on which the Prime Minister had made remarks to visiting Arab dignitaries regarding the supply of defence equipment to Iran. On 13 May 1985 the Prime Minister had met a delegation from the Arab League Follow Up Committee. The delegation had been led by the Secretary General of the Arab League, M. Klibi, and had included Mr Tariq Aziz. In a letter dated 13 May 1985 Mr Charles Powell, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, recorded that (inter alia) the Prime Minister had “stress[ed] that the United Kingdom did not intend to enter into new contracts for the supply of ships, marine engines, hovercraft or other advanced equipment to Iran.” *8 This indication, which contained no reference to the limiting “significant enhancement” factor, would have represented a more rigorous approach to Iran that the actual Guidelines agreed in December. At a Ministerial meeting held on 19 June 1986, of which more hereafter, Mr Renton, Minister of State at the FCO, reinforced his opposition to the supply of helicopters to Iran by reference to the remarks that the Prime Minister had made to M. Klibi. The DTI Note of the 19 June 1986 meeting records that “There was some discussion at to how widely this [i.e. the Prime Minister’s remarks to M. Klibi] should be interpreted.” *9

Endnotes
*3 - see CO/32.PM/2.70 at p. 75 and 79

*4 - see CO/32.PM/2.84

*5 - see FCO/2.4.22, paragraph 11: See also paragraph 4 of Mr Collins’ note dated 19 December 1985 - FCO/2.4.14

*6 - see FCO/2.4.16, paragraph 4

*7 - see FCO/2.4.12

*8 - see FCO/13.1.10, at p. 12

*9 - see DTI/36.959

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.