Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
Specific Cases - (xv) Avon Engines for Hunter Aircraft

D2.232 In July 1987 an AWP application relating to the supply of 6 Avon engines to Iraq for installation in Hunter aircraft was received by the MOD. The application was considered at the IDC meeting held on 31 July 1987. The Summary Record of the meeting records that “the MOD assured the IDC that the aircraft had been used for training, and they believed the aircraft were now due for onward sale to an African country. The Iraqis had more modern aircraft. The engines for the Hunters were not militarily significant. The FCO noted the presentational problems of supplying aircraft engines to the Iraqis and foresaw that further details might be needed. The IDC recommended in favour.” *342 The proposed supply of the Hunter engines to Iraq was being considered concurrently with an application for the supply to Iran of spares for its F4 Phantom aircraft. The MODWG had assessed the supply to be A(I) and the IDC had recommended approval.

D2.233 Mr Young (head of MED) in a Note dated 2 September 1987 commented on the two applications: “Ministers may be concerned at the presentational aspects... the Hunter aircraft for Iraq are certainly too old to have any significant military value especially given Iraq’s large and modern airforce. The F-4 Phantom spares for Iran are fairly innocuous in themselves...”, and concluded “In substance therefore I agree with the IDC recommendation that these two sales go through. The main argument against in both cases is, as I have said, presentational.” *343

D2.234 Mr Alan Munro, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for the Middle East, in a manuscript comment dated 3 September, said that “In the present situation of escalating hostilities the supply of any spares for combat aircraft (even obsolete Hunters) could help enhance Iran’s war effort. Against this background supply would be particularly hard to justify in international and domestic terms and could detract from our leading role in pressing for Iranian acceptance of 598. I recommend deferment of a decision.” *344

D2.235 Mr Munro’s advice was accepted by FCO Ministers. At the IDC meeting on 15 September 1987, “The FCO informed the IDC that their Ministers had been unable to approve of the recommendations [concerning the Avon engines for Iraq’s Hunters and the spares for Iran’s F- 4 Phantoms]. FCO Ministers believed that a decision should be deferred on both these ELAs. As a result of that decision the FCO believed that all further export licence applications for spares for Iraqi and Iranian military aircraft should remain pending.” *345

D2.236 This represents a very good example of the use by FCO of export control for the purpose of achieving, or trying to achieve, political objectives unrelated to the specific licence applications.

D2.237 The ability of government to use export control in this way is, given the export control scheme in existence under the 1939 Act, undoubted. Whether it is a use for export control that ought to be available to government is another matter and one that deserves careful consideration, public debate and, if an affirmative answer is to be given, Parliamentary sanction.

D2.238 It is evident that, in relation to these aircraft spares, the criteria that were being applied in order to determine whether or not the proposed sales should be approved had little, if anything, to do with the Guidelines.

Endnotes
*342 - see FCO/2.5.86 at paragraph 5(b)

*343 - see FCO/2.5.85

*344 - see FCO/2.5.85

*345 - see FCO/2.5.50 at paragraph 5(a)

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.