Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
Specific Cases - (ix) Night Vision Equipment

D2.200 In 1985 the MODWG and the IDC had to consider proposals for the supply of Night Vision Equipment to Iran and Iraq. The MODWG advised in June 1985 that there were no MOD objections to the supply of “1st and 2nd Generation” equipment. *299 But in October 1985 an AWP application for the supply of 2nd Generation P4480 Night Sights was refused. The Iraq desk in Defence Sales asked for a review of policy to be conducted. *300

D2.201 Accordingly, in April 1986 a policy paper on the promotion and supply of Night Vision Equipment was prepared by DESS with contribution from the MODWG experts. The paper distinguished between Thermal Imagers and Image Intensifiers. Image Intensifiers were further divided into three generations, according to the type of tube which they incorporated. The “third generation” was described as having a 40% advantage over a “second generation” device of comparable size. *301 The paper raised no MOD objections to the supply of first and second generation Image Intensifiers but advised that “because of the sensitivity of the technology... supply of third generation tubes cannot be envisaged in the foreseeable future to either Iran or Iraq irrespective of a cessation of hostilities”.

D2.202 The MOD paper was considered by the IDC at its meeting on 20 May 1986. The IDC and Ministers endorsed the paper and agreed to apply the following criteria to all applications for night vision equipment:

“(1) The supply of thermal imaging equipment should not be permitted before 1987, or the end of hostilities, whichever shall be the [later];

(2) The supply of weapon related sights incorporating image intensifiers should not be permitted;

(3) The supply of 1st generation Image Intensifier Tubes and devices which are not weapon related should be permitted;

(4) The supply of 2nd generation devices which are not weapon related sights should be permitted;

(5) The supply of 2nd generation tubes in bulk quantities should not be permitted;

(6) The supply of 3rd generation tubes and/or devices should not be permitted”. *302

D2.203 Paragraph (2) and the qualification in paragraph (3) reflect the requirement of guideline (i) that lethal equipment should not be supplied to Iran or Iraq. Paragraph (5) was attributable, presumably, to guideline (iii). Thereapart the criteria reflect security concerns rather than the Guidelines.

D2.204 Mr Collins, in a Note dated 21 May 1986 to senior FCO officials, recommended that the FCO should accept “this refined policy which shows that we can fine tune our consideration of defence sales to Iran and Iraq”. *303

D2.205 Thereafter the special criteria as well as the Howe Guidelines were applied to ELAs for Thermal Imagers and Image Intensifiers.

HAWKEYE SYSTEMS LTD

D2.206 At a meeting on 27 April 1988 the IDC considered an application by Hawkeye Systems Ltd for revalidation of an export licence for the supply to Iraq of a long range surveillance system. The application had been approved by the MOD, on the basis that the equipment would not significantly enhance the capability of Iraq to prolong or exacerbate the conflict. But it had been placed on the pending list because the Minister (DP), Lord Trefgarne, had asked to see further details “on the company concerned” before he reached a final decision on the IDC’s recommendation to approve the application. Mr Barrett, DESS2, prepared a minute dated 24 May for APS/Minister DP summarising the discussion at the IDC meeting and stated that:

“Minister (DP) will wish to note particularly the following:

....The company - Hawkeye Systems Ltd - both manufacture and act as agents for a wide range of surveillance equipment using thermal imaging, image intensification and conventional daylight CCTV systems...

This application however refers to a long range surveillance system which employs old technology and does not involve a significant enhancement”. *304

Lord Trefgarne approved the recommendations of the Committee *305 and on 13 June 1988 the DTI was so informed.

So this application was cleared for export by the application both of the 20 May 1986 guidelines and of paragraph (iii) of the Howe Guidelines.

THE ENGLISH ELECTRIC VALVE COMPANY LTD

D2.207 At a meeting on 14 July 1988 the IDC considered an AWP application by The English Electric Valve Company (EEV) for the export for supply to Iraq of 1st and 2nd Generation Image Intensifiers. In the Summary Record of the IDC meeting on 14 July 1988 *306 under the heading Arms Working Party Applications it was stated that:

“2...

Iraq - first and second generation image intensifiers (p.B1)

The MOD Working Group have recommended that approval be given for first generation image intensifiers but not for second. MOD explained that the first generation intensifiers were too unsophisticated and bulky to have serious military significance. Second generation intensifiers may, however, have military applications [i.e. may be weapon related]. The IDC accepted this advice....”

FCO and the MOD ministers agreed with the recommendations. *307

On the footing that the second generation intensifiers were “weapon related”, the refusal of AWP approval seems attributable to an application of paragraph (4) of the guidelines in the 20 May 1986 paper rather than to the application of the Howe Guidelines.

D2.208 It is relevant in this connection to notice that at the IDC meeting on 23 January 1987, a firm that had been refused permission to supply or to promote Thermal Imager equipment in Iraq sought approval to invite Iraqi military representatives for a promotion (at unclassified level) in Jordan. The IDC recommended approval “on the grounds that such activity would be discreet and would not do anything to enhance the Iraqis current capabilities”. *308 On 16 February 1987 Mr Renton expressed concern about this recommendation. *309

Endnotes
*299 - see MOD/8.2.181 at paragraph 2(a)

*300 - see MOD/8.4.139

*301 - see MOD/9.2.241

*302 - see MOD/9.3.225. In paragraph (1), the actual text has the word “earlier” not “later”. However “earlier” was an evident mistake. See e.g. MOD/9.3.237 at paragraph 5(a)

*303 - see FCO/2.4.180 at paragraph 2(d)

*304 - MOD/15.2.113 at paragraph 2(d) 305 MOD/15.2.147

*306 - MOD/15.3.143

*307 - MOD/15.3.151; MOD/15.3.211

*308 - see FCO/2.5.214 at paragraph 1(c)

*309 - FCO/2.5.213

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.