Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
Specific Cases - (vii) Radar

D2.185 At the IDC meeting held on 18 December 1984 it was noted that Mr Luce had approved the supply of Plessey AR15M radar to Iran and that the MOD recommended the approval of the supply of spares for Plessey ASWI and ARI naval radar and HF200 radar. This equipment was covered by long standing Iranian contracts and was relatively outdated equipment. MOD also recommended, however, that the supply of more modern radar systems, such as Plessey’s Watchman and Marconi’s Martello, should not be approved. *274

D2.186 During 1985 the supply of radar to Iran was discussed in the IDC on several occasions. There was broad agreement that the supply of static radar to be positioned on Iran’s border with the USSR was unobjectionable but that mobile 3D radar, suitable for the forward control of fighter aircraft, should not be approved. *275

D2.187 At the MODWG meeting held on 16 April 1986 the supply by Marconi of S711 Low Level radar to Iraq was raised by the Defence Sales Iraq representative, ARM2a. It was agreed that DIS would prepare an analysis of existing Iraqi radar capability on which an assessment of the significance of the proposed supply could be based. *276 The DIS reported on 21 April 1986 that “whilst we have no technology transfer objections to the supply of S711 radars to Iraq our assessment is that supply of 12 such radars would significantly enhance the Iraqi air defence capability at low altitude.” *277 The DIS assessment was put to the IDC meeting held on 24 April 1986. DTI representatives informed the meeting that Racal had wanted to supply 20 sets of comparable radar (Possum) to Iran and suggested that, “for a sense of balance” the Racal application for Iran and the Marconi application for Iraq might both be approved. The MOD agreed to reconsider the Marconi application. 278 Accordingly, on 30 April, Mr Jones, DESS2, wrote a Note to DI(AG)1 (the defence sales desk at DIS) and to D Cts (ROW)1 asking for advice “on how [the enhancement of Iraq’s capability] would serve to prolong or exacerbate the conflict, particularly in the context of the very limited Iranian air attack capability which [the radars] would be used to counter.” *279 The DIS response was given by D Cts Staff (ROW1) in a Note dated 2 May 1986. *280 The officer supported the assessment given on 21 April, agreed that significant enhancement alone, unconnected with “the prolongation/exacerbation factor” would not suffice to bar an export but gave this assessment: “...even if the guideline is applied according to this stricter interpretation, supply of the S711 would still be debarred, because it would undoubtedly significantly enhance Iraq’s capability to prolong the war in that it would enable her to resist airborne attack in a way and area that was not available to her before”. It is interesting to notice that the officer then continued with these observations: “Thus an argument based strictly on the guidelines would debar the sale. But taking a wider defence and probably Foreign Policy view, British interests in the Gulf area suggest that we should do all we can to prevent an Iranian victory, and in that context we should supply the radar and indeed any other equipment which helps Iraq to defend itself”. He concluded by saying “My ‘gut’ reaction (for what it is worth) is to allow the sale, but to make clear to our radar salesmen that, given the balance of forces, we could not allow a similar sale to Iran. Fortunately we do not have to justify publicly our interpretation of the guidelines”. A manuscript note appended to the Note reads “Spoke to Sec(O)C who advised that we should stick to guidelines, leaving the wider question of foreign policy considerations to the FCO to consider”.

D2.188 RM2a then raised the question whether, if the number of radar supplied were reduced to 4 or 6 systems in total, the significant enhancement assessment would still apply. *281 The point was put to DI(AG)1 and D.Cts (ROW)1. The view of DI(AG)1 was that even one system would constitute an enhancement of Iraq’s capability and that the significance of the supply would depend on how the radar or radars were deployed rather than on the number supplied. D. Cts (ROW)1’s view was that “the numbers game did not enter into the equation and that one or two systems would still be a significant enhancement.” *282

D2.189 At the IDC meeting held on 20 May 1986, the DIS assessment of the supply of S711 Radars to Iraq was discussed. The Summary Record of the meeting records that “Although the 12 sets proposed were considered to be a significant enhancement, it was possible that a case could be made for a breach of the guidelines for industrial reasons. RM agreed to produce a note on the industrial implications for the company of the contract. The industrial and political arguments would be discussed at the next meeting.”

D2.190 Mr Collins provided a Note dated 21 May 1986 for senior FCO officials on the state of play on the radar ELAs. He referred to the Plessey proposals to supply Iran with static radar to be stationed on the Iranian border with the USSR and advised that “MOD are likely to endorse the Plessey proposals and confirm that they are within the Ministerial guidelines”. He then referred to the Marconi proposal to sell 12 sets of S711 radar to Iraq and to the MOD view that these would constitute a significant enhancement of Iraqi capability. He recommended that when MOD come forward with the industrial arguments in favour of the sale to Iraq, the two proposals might be considered as “an off-setting package”. He said “if we can defend the sale of 3D Radar to Iran on the clear grounds that they are not applicable to the conflict, we should also, in principle, be able to defend the sale of radars to Iraq, given our current assessment that Iraq is likely to come under increasing military pressure in the longer term.” *283 The same thought seems to lie behind Mr Collins’ remarks as lay behind the “gut reaction” of D. Cts staff (ROW1) as expressed in his Note of 2 May 1986.

D2.191 At its meeting on 24 June 1986, the IDC recommended rejection of the ELA for the supply of S711 radar to Iraq. The DESO case for supply on industrial grounds had not been produced. *284

D2.192 At the IDC meeting on 27 February 1987, the question of supply by Marconi of 3D Radar to Iraq was discussed. The IDC recommended that Marconi be informed that exports of 3D Radar to Iraq would have to be on the same basis as those for Iran, namely, that the radar be static and sited away from the war area. *285

D2.193 And finally, I should refer to an ELA for the supply to Iraq of 360 Degree Sonar radar for installation on naval vessels. The ELA was considered at the IDC meeting held on 28 June 1988. The IDC recommended approval of the ELA on the basis of advice that “Although this equipment would not be approved for sale to the Iranian Navy, ...since Iraq had no functional naval capability, the supply of this equipment would not represent a significant enhancement of Iraq’s military capability.” *286

Endnotes
*274 - see FCO/2.4.1 at paragraph 5(i)

*275 - see FCO/2.4.27 at paragraph 12, FCO/2.4.219 at paragraph 9

*276 - see MOD/9.3.9 at paragraph 2(e)

*277 - see MOD/9.3.17 278 see FCO/2.4.192 at paragraph 14

*279 - see MOD/9.3.77

*280 - see MOD/9.3.95

*281 - see MOD/9.3.105

*282 - see MOD/9.3.109

*283 - see FCO/2.4.180 at paragraph 2(b)

*284 - see FCO/2.4.172 and FCO/2.4.173 at paragraph 4

*285 - see FCO/2.5.167 at paragraph 6(c)

*286 - see FCO/2.6.189 at paragraph 2(i)

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.