Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 2 Applications of The Guidelines in the period
December 1984 to August 1988

Excerpt:
Specific Cases - (iii) Helicopters

D2.140 The IDC meeting held on 15 January 1986 discussed, inter alia, the sale of Westland W30 helicopters to Iran. The DTI presented a paper setting out the commercial and industrial arguments in favour of approving the export. The intended use, it was said, was by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Helicopters are, however, inevitably of a dual-use character. The MODWG had expressed the view that they could be used for transporting troops in the front line or for boarding and searching ships in the Gulf and that the export of any number of helicopters would be a “clear breach of Ministerial guidelines on defence sales to Iran”. The FCO supported the MOD. The DTI continued to press for the ELA to be approved. *210

D2.141 In February 1986, however, the ELB pointed out to Mr Hextall, DESS2, that the export of civil helicopters with an unladen weight of less than 4530 Kgs was licensed by an OGEL under which Iran and Iraq were authorised destinations. The unladen weight of a W30 helicopter was 4,082Kg. So export to Iran or to Iraq was franked by the OGEL. *211 But it was accepted that the OGEL did not resolve the issue. If the export of the helicopters was one which should not be approved then, and, indeed, in any event, the OGEL should be varied by the removal of Iran and Iraq as authorised destinations. This, in the event, happened.

D2.142 At the request of MOD Ministers, the opinion of Sir Patrick Wright, the then Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, was sought. Sir Patrick, in a telex (No. 130) advised firmly against approval of the export. Saudi reaction, he said, would, in view of the Iranian offensive in the south, be adverse. *212 A particular consideration, so far as Saudi Arabian reaction was concerned, was that a very substantial agreement, sometimes known as the Al Yamamah agreement, for the supply by the MOD of Tornado aircraft and other defence equipment to Saudi Arabia had recently been concluded. Al Yamamah has been described as the biggest defence equipment deal ever struck by the United Kingdom. Policy regarding defence sales to Iran and Iraq over the period under review was conducted with an eye cocked towards Saudi Arabia. It was treated as a matter of prime importance that nothing should be done vis-à-vis Iran or Iraq that might place in jeopardy the Al Yamamah agreement. The FCO’s opposition to the helicopter ELA was based on the undoubted fact that, as it was put in a submission dated 2 May 1986 put up by Mr Watson (OT4/1b) to Mr Clark, “The value of the Tornado contract to British industry outweighs the small advantages of selling individual items to Iran.” *213

D2.143 Sir Patrick Wright’s opinion, for the reason I have given, carried heavy weight in the Ministerial discussions over the export of W30 helicopters to Iran.

D2.144 The helicopter issue was one of the three issues discussed at the Ministerial meeting of 19 June 1986. The discussion is recorded in the MOD Note of the meeting:

“Mr Clark explained that the proposed sale of 36 W30-160 helicopters was very important to Westland. An assurance would be sought that they would only be used for civilian purposes. Mr Renton replied that not only was it impossible to prevent the helicopters being used for military purposes once delivered but there would be severe implications for the sale of defence equipment to Saudi Arabia, with which Lord Trefgarne agreed. Mr Clark agreed, in the light of these considerations not to pursue this matter further.” *214

So Westland’s ELA was refused. The helicopter story was not, however, over.

D2.145 In May 1986 the MODWG had to consider an AWP application for the approval of the overhaul and repair of 100 helicopter “engine sets” for Iraq. The MODWG assessment was that “since some of the Mi8(HIP) [engines] are in the assault/gunship role, the application... offends the lethal guideline, as the helicopter’s function as an aerial weapons platform depends entirely on a serviceable engine”. The notion that a helicopter engine would be barred from export as being “lethal” seems a rather peculiar interpretation. In addition, however, the MODWG regarded the engines as amounting to “a significant enhancement of Iraq’s ability to prolong or exacerbate the conflict.” *215 The AWP application was refused.

D2.146 In June 1986 the MODWG advised that the acquisition of 16 Advanced Sea King helicopters would represent an unacceptable enhancement of Iraqi capability. *216 A similar view was expressed regarding the supply of 40 W.30 Black Hawk helicopters to Iraq. *217

D2.147 At its meeting on 24 June 1986 the IDC agreed to recommend that AWP applications for 16 Advanced Sea King helicopters and 40 W.30 helicopters, both for Iraq, be refused. *218

Endnotes
*210 - see FCO/2.4.213 and FCO/2.4.219

*211 - see MOD/9.1.177

*212 - see the Summary Record of the IDC of 11 February 1986 paragraphs 1 & 2, MOD/9.1.219

*213 - see DTI/39(A1).1834 at paragraph 17

*214 - see FCO/13.1.55 at paragraph 5

*215 - see MOD/9.3.167

*216 - see MOD/9.4.17 at paragraph 2(c)

*217 - see MOD/9.4.83 at paragraph 2(b) and MOD/9.4.125 at paragraph 2

*218 - see FCO/2.4.167 at paragraph 2

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.