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Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*


Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 1 The Howe Guidelines


Excerpt:
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY


D1.142 The DTI was represented at IDC meetings by four or five officials. The Export Licensing Branch (the ELB) provided the basic DTI representation with, in addition, OT5 and “sponsor divisions” represented as the business at the meetings might require. 161 One of their functions was to try and prevent an over rigorous application (from their point of view) of the Guidelines and to promote the case for the grant of the licences. Unlike the FCO and (after July 1985) the MOD practice, the decisions and recommendations of the IDC on ELAs were not put to the relevant DTI Minister, the Minister for Trade (MFT), for approval. Instead, the DTI officials awaited the formal views of FCO Ministers and MOD Ministers. If those views were in favour of the grant of export licences, the DTI proceeded to issue the licences. In relation to ELAs where either or both of the FCO and MOD were opposed to the grant of licences, the DTI officials might refer the matter to the MFT in order that, at a Ministerial level, the case for the grant of the licences might continue to be pressed. In a Note dated 11 January 1985 reviewing the matters dealt with at the IDC meeting held on 8 January, Mr D Jones (OT5/1B), one of the DTI representatives at the meeting, noted that “it did seem that FCO view ‘presentational’ aspects as of equal importance to any question of operational capabilities” and expressed this conclusion:

“FCO are putting submissions to their Ministers on a regular basis: DTI should be prepared to do so if/when it is considered that either important industrial questions are at stake or FCO is attempting to be more restrictive than agreed guidelines.” 162

D1.143 Mr Jones’ last point echoes Mr Channon’s view to which I have already referred. *163 Mr Jones’ conclusion underlines the absence in the DTI, unlike the FCO and the MOD, of any regular practice whereby the decisions and recommendations of the IDC were put to Ministers for approval or information.

D1.144 It is important to notice, first, that if the other departments were content that licences should be issued, the ELAs would without more ado be issued by DTI officials, and, secondly, that if either of the other departments were not content, it was not regarded as open to the DTI to issue the licences.

 

Endnotes
*161 - DTI/39(A1).1701 Note dated 4 December 1984 from Mr P C Sanders of the ELB to Mr Hall

*162 - DTI/39 (A1).1715

*163 see paragraph D1.93 et seq.

 

 

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.

 

 

 


 

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