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Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*


Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 1 The Howe Guidelines


Excerpt:
THE FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE


D1.124 It had been agreed at the meeting of 29 November 1984 that the FCO would provide the Chairman of the IDC and, according to the DTI Note, “take the lead”. Mr Day, Head of MED from November 1984 to January 1987, was the first Chairman. In addition to the Chairman, the IDC members usually included two FCO officials from MED and one from the FCO’s Defence Department. Following each IDC meeting, a “Summary Record” of the meeting was prepared by one of the MED officials. Copies were sent to those who had attended the meeting. The Chairman of the meeting then prepared a Submission to senior FCO officials and for the private secretary of the Minister of State. The Submission would draw attention to points of particular interest or importance and would be accompanied by a copy of the Summary Record. The Note would recommend the Minister to agree with the conclusions reached at the IDC meeting. It is important to notice that the IDC’s conclusions were, so far as the Minister was concerned, no more than recommendations. The system before the Howe Guidelines and before the introduction of the IDC was that ELAs submitted to the FCO would not be granted unless and until the FCO had concurred, or until higher authority had overruled FCO objections. The IDC provided a forum for inter-departmental discussions and, in many cases, for a consensus to be reached before the case was put up to the Minister. It did not avoid the need for FCO concurrence to be obtained before an export licence was granted.

D1.125 It is also important to note that the submissions to FCO Ministers seeking approval for IDC recommendations were not generally copied to recipients outside MED. As a consequence, where an FCO department other than MED had been involved in the consideration of ELAs, or had an interest in the outcome of IDC deliberations, that other department would not necessarily know either of the outcome at the IDC or of the recommendation to Ministers. In one case involving an ELA submitted by Consarc, the IDC were told on 28 April 1989 that FCO/SEND had approved an ELA. *137 This was not true. On 18 April 1989, SEND had said that they would not approve the licence. SEND did not, however, become aware that these views had been misrepresented at the IDC meeting and the means for their becoming aware were absent.

 

 

Endnotes
*137 - ELA 3G/02484/89. See paragraph D6.312 et seq.; and FCO/6.2.78, SIS/258.13. See also the evidence of Mr Roland Smith, former head of SEND, dated 22 July 1994 at paragraph 8.4.4

 

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.

 

 

 

 


 

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