Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons
dated 18 July 1996 for the Appendices to the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions laid before The House on 15 February 1996*

Volume One
Section D Arms and Defence-Related Exports to Iraq
Chapter 1 The Howe Guidelines

Excerpt:
THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE

D1.116 The constitution of the IDC had been broadly agreed upon at the meeting on 29 November 1984 between officials of the three departments. *133

D1.117 Mr Collins, in his written statement to the Inquiry dated 28 May 1993 described the IDC as follows:

“The IDC was an informal committee which met at working level and drew together representatives of the DTI (Market and Specialist Branches), MOD (Operations and Sales Branches) and the FCO (MED and Defence Department). A system quickly evolved whereby an in-house MOD Working Group (on which the FCO were not represented) would first review all applications from the point of view of enhancing military capability in order to test them against the Guidelines. These conclusions were then presented to the IDC. The MOD’s military judgement was invariably accepted. If there was, nonetheless, a disagreement in the IDC which could not be resolved by officials, it was put to Ministers. The FCO in any case put all records and decisions of the IDC to Ministers for final approval given the sensitivity of both approving and rejecting applications. The IDC also became a useful forum for discussing business related to the export of defence equipment, such as items not licensable but which might be considered sensitive. The IDC met twice in 1984, nine times in 1985 and five times in 1986 up to the time I left MED in May. It was considered a successful operation by FCO Senior Management and Ministers, in that it allowed much better liaison between Departments than would have been possible by correspondence or ad hoc meetings. It also allowed Ministers to be better briefed on the views of other Departments thus saving them time and reducing disagreements to a minimum.”

D1.118 In a supplemental statement to the Inquiry dated 14 July 1993, Mr Collins said:

“The IDC acted as a clearing house for licence applications for Iran and Iraq. It was not a high-powered committee with a wide ranging set of responsibilities. It’s job was to pull the FCO, MOD and DTI together to ensure that applications that would normally be considered separately were considered collectively. Members of the IDC were junior officials or military officers dependant on instructions given to them by more senior management in their respective departments. It was not a grouping that would command attention in the rest of Whitehall. It was rather a simple but useful piece of machinery to cut down correspondence between departments and speed up decision making ....”

D1.119 Other witnesses to the Inquiry were, broadly, in agreement with Mr Collins’ description of the IDC’s function, although some regarded the IDC as a committee with greater significance and weight than Mr Collins was prepared to accord it.

D1.120 The IDC was not a committee all the members of which would necessarily, or even ordinarily, have been cleared to see or know about highly classified material. The MOD representatives at the IDC did not include anyone from the DIS. To the extent, therefore, that current intelligence relevant to the issue of whether export licences should be granted for particular exports might be available, only limited discussion about that intelligence would be possible at IDC meetings. The intelligence would need to be taken into account either by the FCO or by the MOD, or by both, when considering whether to approve or to oppose the grant of the licences in question. The DIS representative at MODWG meetings would, of course, have full security clearance, but others at the meeting, e.g. the RMD representatives, might not. Accordingly, even at MODWG meetings, the use that could be made of relevant intelligence might be inhibited. Mr Alan Barrett, who was in post at DESS2 from 29 June 1987 to 30 September 1990, and, therefore, during that period chaired the meetings of the MODWG, gave evidence that “once there were intelligence reports, perhaps, to be considered, they [the RMD officers] may not have had the appropriate clearance to see those reports. However, generally speaking, they had sufficient clearance to be able to hear the reasons for the objection to the export and security advisers were not constrained in any way to tell them the reason.” *134

D1.121 At the IDC meeting on 18 May 1989, the suggestion was made by MOD representatives that, in order to enable the IDC to hear at first hand the views of the MOD’s military experts, the MODWG and the IDC should be amalgamated. The IDC, however, expressed reservations, namely:

“The function of the MOD Working Group was to provide technical advise [sic] on licence applications, while that of the IDC was to consider applications in the light of the Ministerial guidelines. To merge the two bodies into one risked blurring their distinctive roles. The Committee noted that the experts would not be at liberty to disclose certain information to non-MOD officials .....” *135

D1.122 The suggestion was dropped. It would, if adopted, have been a means of ensuring that the views of MODWG experts were communicated to the IDC. Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook gave evidence of the occasional failure of MOD officials to convey to the IDC the substance of relevant views voiced by MODWG experts. *136

D1.123 The relationship between the IDC and the three departments, officials from which made up its membership, is important to an understanding of the manner in which licensing decisions were reached. It is convenient to take each department in turn.

Endnotes
*133 - DTI/39 (A1).1706, paragraph 3

*134 - Transcript of Mr Barrett’s oral evidence, Day 36, 1 November 1993 p.19

*135 - FCO/6.2.42

*136 see, generally, Lieut-Colonel Glazebrook’s written statement dated 29 April 1993 at paragraphs 12 and 13; and pp. 134-135 and 146-147 of his oral evidence on Day 4. More particularly, see his evidence as to his belief that Ministers (and, specifically, Minister (DP)) had not been adequately briefed for their meeting on 1 November 1989: paragraph 14 of his written statement (Ibid.); p. 156 et seq. of his oral evidence (Ibid.) and p. 1 et seq. of his oral evidence on Day 5. See also paragraph D6.193 infra.

* The Full report is available from The Stationery Office Ltd., PO Box 276, London, SW8 5DT.