MR STRAW: It's a pleasure to welcome my good friend Antonio Martins da Cruz, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, to London today and this follows a meeting very recently between our respective Prime Ministers.  We have discussed a wide range of bilateral issues. We had a toast to the oldest alliance between our two countries, talked about strengthening of relations, including trade relations between our countries. We talked about the Lisbon agenda and the forthcoming Brussels Summit next week, next Thursday and Friday, which we'll both be attending, where we'll be discussing further work on the liberalisation of markets and the improvement of the functioning of the economies across Europe to produce more prosperity and more jobs for our peoples. We talked about the Future of Europe and the Convention on the Future of Europe and about President Giscard d'Estaing's attendance at the Brussels Summit and then we came onto wider issues. Those included matters relating to Africa - we both have strong historical ties with parts of Africa - and also the issue of Iraq.  As far as Africa is concerned, I expressed my personal and our Government's gratitude to Antonio and to his Prime Minister for the very co-operative approach which they showed to difficulties on which we had led in respect of Zimbabwe, which posed practical problems for Portugal because they in the end had to cancel the European Union/Africa Union Summit and we are extremely grateful to you, Antonio, for how that was handled.  In a sense a problem not in any way of Portugal's making. And on Iraq, it's a matter of course for Antonio to describe the Government of Portugal's position but broadly we are in the same position of support for resolution 1441, and for all that was spelled out in that resolution if Iraq continued to be in non-compliance with it.

MR MARTINS DA CRUZ (Portuguese)

MR STRAW: Well it's never my practice over many years to disclose details of Cabinet discussions but I can tell you that the discussion in Cabinet was a very constructive one, fully supporting the full implementation of 1441 and an acknowledgement that this placed responsibilities most self-evidently on Iraq but also on all members of the Security Council to see its proper enforcement and backing for the efforts of the Prime Minister and myself to try to secure that second resolution.

MR MARTINS DA CRUZ: Of course as you know in Europe there are different sensibilities, especially if we consider that Europe is, the members of the European Union are countries and nations with hundreds and hundreds of history, foreign policies, strategies. But we believe that these different strategies cannot, must not jeopardise the European ideal. So we believe that it is not only possible but it's our duty and the duty of the 15 members of the European Union to work together to reinforce Europe, to reinforce European institutions. These differences over specific questions like the Iraq crisis cannot, must not jeopardise the future of Europe. So we believe that the next European Council could be probably the starting point of the rebuilding of the trust among Europeans.

MR STRAW: Well I regret to say I didn't watch Newsnight last night because I think I was on the phone to a foreign minister. In fact I'm sure I was.  So apologies to Newsnight for missing the programme and I'm not sure what you're talking about but what I can say is that the 6 key tests that have been drawn up are very serious. They are themselves taken from a 173-page document published last Friday by Dr Blix to the Security Council and they are tests or benchmarks against which it would be possible for the international community to measure Saddam's compliance with the disarmament obligations of 1441.  Now I happen to regard the possibility, indeed the reality of a state having poisoned gases and deadly viruses as a very, very serious matter and therefore a responsibility on the international community to deal with that properly also very serious.

QUESTION: Apparently your proposals of the 6 tests were not very well accepted by France or by Russia and by the United States. Aren't you feeling a little isolated on that?

MR STRAW: Certainly not and this may not be obvious but the position of the United States is rather different on the implementation of 1441 from the other two countries which you mentioned and I am clear that they will support these tests. What we're anxious about “ that's not a question “ what we're anxious about is whether we gain the support of other countries and are able to get this resolution through.

MR STRAW: Well France must be the judge of its national interest and it would be impertinent of me to seek to second-guess that.  My point that I found extraordinary and inexplicable was a statement by their Head of State that whatever the circumstances, whatever the circumstances, France would veto the draft resolution and by implication any draft resolution. Now I find that very strange because that is a statement by France that whatever the circumstances and i.e. even if it is flagrantly obvious, which it is now, that Saddam Hussein is in flagrant breach of his obligations, France will veto a resolution requiring Saddam's compliance and the consequences will follow, I find that extraordinary for all sorts of reasons but the most important reason why I find it extraordinary is because France voluntarily not only signed up to resolution 1441 but was very actively and commendably active in the negotiation of that resolution over a 2-month period. But the words mean what they say and the words will become meaningless if you don't follow through the message.

MR STRAW: Well we carry on is the answer. I don't accept that, although I'm not suggesting though they are exact parallels. There were many moments when we were negotiating resolution 1441 when I thought, to pick up your phrase, that the diplomatic moves had run into the sands. They were moments of very great frustration and then finally and suddenly things came together. So we're not going to give up until we've come to a final conclusion that it is simply not possible to reach an agreement but what we are clear about in any event is that overwhelmingly the evidence is there of Saddam's non-compliance. I mean no one who reads 1441, the definition of a further material breach, and then simply understands that Saddam failed in the disclosure he made on 7 December and he's failed in his obligations since, and not one member of the Security Council over 4 successive Security Council meetings said the opposite. If you read that they are plainly in further material breach and therefore the Security Council has to shoulder its responsibilities for the full enforcement of that resolution.

MR STRAW: Well look, that suggestion actually we are responsible for it because we put it in the statement. It didn't come directly from us. If the only issue between us, our partners in the Security Council and Saddam Hussein is whether or not he makes a television broadcast, then we're happy to drop that.  Of course there has to be a statement by him in his native language, in Arabic, that he does accept that he's been in non-compliance with a whole succession of resolutions since 1991, that he recognises what is the truth, that they've got and have had biological, chemical weapons programme in breach of all the resolutions and that he's now taking action to bring themselves into compliance. And we set out in that list things they've got to do very rapidly. It's not about their total disarmament in a matter of days and it never has been. It's about making clear that they are now coming into compliance, so saying where all the anthrax is or providing clear documentation about its destruction, doing the same with the VX nerve agent, the same with the unmanned aerial vehicles.