Mr Speaker, only eight weeks have passed since Saddam Hussein's brutal regime fell. In that time we and our Coalition partners have set about the task of helping the people of Iraq build a more secure, prosperous and democratic nation. Enormous challenges remain in what will be a long-term commitment. But, slowly, the situation on the ground is improving.

Today in southern Iraq it is safe enough for UN agencies to operate albeit with significant precautions. In the north, in one of the US sectors, the situation is also broadly improving.

But in Baghdad the situation remains unsatisfactory. There are still too many cases of violence against Iraqi civilians and coalition troops. The establishment of a secure environment in Baghdad, and the provision of services is the top priority for the Coalition and was one of the main items of discussion between my RHF the Prime Minister and President Bush last week.

Mr Speaker, when I last reported to the House on 12 May, I informed honourable Members of the progress we were making to obtain a Security Council Resolution which established that 'vital role' for the UN to which my RHF the Prime Minister and President Bush had committed themselves at Hillsborough on 8 April.

On the first day of our recess, UNSCR 1483 was passed. Copies have been placed in the Library. I am pleased to tell the House that this resolution more than delivers on the Hillsborough undertaking.

Resolution 1483 is a comprehensive post-conflict resolution by the Security Council. Paragraph 11 reaffirms that Iraq 'must meet its disarmament obligations' and reiterates UNSCRs 687, 1284, 1441 - the key disarmament resolutions passed since the Gulf War. The resolution was passed unanimously, after much negotiation and amendment of the text between the sponsors of the draft - Spain, the US and the UK - and the other 12 members of the Security Council.

Far from it being possible, as some have alleged, that votes in the Security Council can be achieved 'by bullying,' this year's experience shows clearly that members of the Security Council make up their own minds on issues. They did not agree a so-called second Resolution in March. But they did agree 1441 last November, and they agreed 1483 on 22 May. Would France and China and Russia and Germany have called just two weeks ago for Iraq to meet its disarmament obligations if they had believed that those obligations had already been met? Of course they would not.

Today, Coalition forces are stepping up their efforts to investigate sites, documentation and individuals connected with Iraq's WMD programmes. The Prime Minister has addressed this so there is no need for me to repeat what he has said here.

Mr Speaker, the Motion before the House focuses on the claim that WMD were capable of being used at 45 minutes notice - and further recalls the Government contention that these weapons posed an 'imminent danger to UK forces.' The intelligence dossier actually said that Saddam's military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. I want to make clear to the House why Ministers and the joint intelligence committee regarded that information as reliable. It came from an established and reliable source - not a defector - who has been reporting to us secretly for some years. The intelligence became available at the end of August. It was discussed by the JIC in the first week of September, and was included straightaway in classified JIC documents. The fact that it had already been included in JIC assessments before its appearance in the public dossier, puts in perspective the wilder accusations in the media.

But the Motion before the House implies that this was a key factor in the decision to go to war. It was not. The dossier concerned was published on 24 September. Six months passed before this House was invited to agree to the UK's participation in military action and did so. In that period, as the House and the country knows, we moved heaven and earth to avoid military action, to get 1441 passed, to get the inspectors in.

We took a military decision in mid March based on the situation in mid March, not the situation as it might be in early June. There were four critical factors:

Mr Speaker, I ask our critics:

• do they seriously believe that when Saddam Hussein chose confrontation rather than co-operation, he possessed no WMD?

• do they seriously argue that Saddam had disposed of all his poisons and toxins and missiles, and then deliberately chose not to prove their destruction, but to go down a path that led to his downfall?

• even if we make the most extreme allowances for the warped mentality of a murderous dictator, how can we possibly believe he cheated and deceived the international community year after year until we had no option but military action - and yet he possessed no WMD?

Mr Speaker, is it not more likely that, knowing the game was up, and realising that this time we meant what we said, Saddam went to extraordinary lengths to dismantle, conceal and disperse the weapons and the evidence of their existence? He had spent years perfecting the art of concealment, and carried it out so completely that will take us some time to search the hundreds of sites, interviews the thousands of scientists, locate and evaluate what remains of the documentary and physical evidence.

The ISC is composed of senior members of all parties and both Houses. As a Minister responsible for one or other of the intelligence agencies over the six years of this administration I personally can testify to the independence and thoroughness with which they conduct their inquiries. And their report will of course be subject to debate in both Houses. So there is no basis for the Lib Dems motion. And, on the wider issues raised by it, I am wholly satisfied that the decision which this House took on 18 March by a majority of 263 was correct and justified then, and is still as correct and justified today.

I urge the House to reject the amendment, and support the motion.