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INTERVIEW
WITH JACK STRAW UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE November 10, 2002
INTERVIEWER: You can't surely believe that Saddam Hussein is going to hold his hands up and say 'I did have weapons of mass destruction, but now I've given them all up'? FOREIGN SECRETARY: Well that would be a surprise, but what I do believe about Saddam Hussein is this: he is one of the most evil and unpleasant dictators in human history. At the same time I do not believe that he is irrational and he now understands that he faces the choice of his lifetime, literally. If he does comply with this United Nations Security Council resolution 1441, then the prospect and the justification for military action will recede. That's the choice that the world has put before him with the Security Council resolution. And we've already seen some indications that he will meet the first, seven-day deadline, set for his acknowledgment that he accepts the Security Council resolution in principle. There's a more important deadline on 7 December, the 30-day deadline. Under Operational Paragraph 3 he's got thirty days in which to produce a complete disclosure of his weapons of mass destruction and the means for producing them. We will know therefore in the next thirty days whether he's serious about complying. INTERVIEWER: But how can we ever believe that the weapons' inspectors under Dr Hans Blix will ever satisfactorily ensure that the conditions set down by the UN are met? FOREIGN SECRETARY: Well, we will come to make a judgement about that. I understand what you're saying - how can you prove that there are no weapons of mass destruction in a country the size of Iraq with all the inherent difficulties of inspecting what amounts to hostile terrain. That's a problem inherent in the nature of weapons inspections, but the previous inspections which took place in the early 1990s did, over time, prove effective as long as the international community were behind the weapons inspectors. It was as a result of the work of the predecessor inspection teams that a huge amount of these weapons were identified and then destroyed. And that process only fell apart when the international community's resolve started to dissolve. One of the reasons why we worked so hard and so long for a unanimous resolution, including one backed by Syria, the representative of the Arab states on the Security Council, was so that there could be no doubt in Saddam Hussein's mind about the backing of the international community for this process and the consequences. I do part company with your suggestion that this resolution is open to a series of interpretations. It's actually very clear. We spent a long time drafting the resolution so that the powers of the inspectors are actually wider and more comprehensive than those of the previous inspection regimes. So I'm optimistic about the process of inspection identifying the WMD holdings, provided there is cooperation within not only the seven days but the 30 days... INTERVIEWER: ...this question of lack of cooperation, that is what some people say are the hidden triggers inside 1441 that would allow the United States or indeed the West generally to take action against Saddam Hussein. What constitutes lack of cooperation? There's a disagreement. Dr Hans Blix thinks some forms of obfuscation or prevarication are more venal than others. The United States would seem to think that any sort of lack of cooperation is the trigger. FOREIGN SECRETARY: No, and the United States, I'm certain, does not think that. Technically what constitutes a further material breach is false statements or omissions in the declarations which will have to be submitted within 30 days, or other failure by Iraq to comply with the terms of the resolution. Now there's a procedure within the resolution by which these breaches are reported to the Security Council and it's then for members of the Security Council to make their own assessment. But if there's a technical breach, a lack of cooperation, Hans Blix's cars given parking tickets, well of course that's not going to be a trigger. On the other hand if it becomes clear that the Iraqi authorities are playing games with the inspectors and are trying to cover up holdings of weapons of mass destruction or otherwise failing fully to comply as they have to in a positive way, then that will be a material breach and it will mean that military action will become the only practical alternative. INTERVIEWER: Well is that the case? Because again, you deny that this is open to different interpretations, but it's all couched in this diplomatic language. For example 1441 dropped the term all necessary means which, as I understand it, is diplomatic code for war, and replaced it with the threat of 'very serious consequences'. FOREIGN SECRETARY: Well I think it's pretty obvious what 'serious consequences' means. Of course there was some negotiation over the text, but the United States and the United Kingdom would not have voted for this text, indeed sponsored the text, had we not been satisfied that it spelt out a very clear set of ultimata to Saddam Hussein, gave the inspectors the best possible powers and also spelt out at the end of the resolution what would happen if Saddam Hussein did not cooperate. It's all there. It's very clear and, yes, military action is bound to follow if Saddam Hussein does not cooperate fully with the terms of this resolution. INTERVIEWER: What happens if all the conditions appear to be met? What's to stop Saddam Hussein biding his time, starting up his weapons programmes again? There's a logic in the Washington position - regime change or permanent occupation - as the only guarantees? FOREIGN SECRETARY: Well there is no time restriction put on the inspection regime, contrary to some misinterpretations of the resolution. If Saddam Hussein complies and he remains in office, it is certainly the case that with his holdings of weapons of mass destruction and his capacity to produce them both removed, then the nature of the regime is changed. In the words of Representative Pete King whom you just interviewed, Saddam Hussein would have been 'defanged', which is a rather colourful, but accurate way of putting it. INTERVIEWER: Will there be a debate in the House of Commons? And if so, what will it be about? Will it be about this United Nations resolution 1441, or will it be about deploying troops? FOREIGN SECRETARY: I told the House in a statement last Thursday that there would indeed be a debate in the House as soon as possible and that I hoped that it would be on a substantive motion. That remains the position. I can't say exactly what the terms of the substantive motion will be because we haven't yet drafted it, but it'll be essentially to confirm and endorse the terms of the Security Council resolution 1441. And of course the debate will encompass the possibility of military action. That's what many of the debates have been about up to now and it's quite right that the House of Commons should debate this critical issue and also take a position on it.
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