FCO: Straw on the critical issue of going to war to disarm Iraq

UK HOUSE OF COMMONS

UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

March 18, 2003

Mr Speaker,

In a few minutes we will vote on the most critical issue that has been before this House, certainly at any time in the twenty-four years that I have been privileged to represent my constituency of Blackburn.

Yes, I have been here before when military action by British troops has been debated. But never before - prior to such action - has the House been asked on a substantive motion for its explicit support for the use of our armed forces. Today it is. It is what the House sought: more important, in a modern democracy, it is constitutionally proper.

But the very fact of the substantive motion and its amendment before the House tonight places on each of us a heavy responsibility, which as individual Members we will carry for years to come. I do not say that for any of us the choice is an easy one. I said in the last debate on 26 February that this was the most difficult issue I have ever had to deal with: that is more true today. Where we are is not, of course, a position in which I wanted this country, the Government or the House to be placed: like my RHF the Prime Minister and many others I have worked for months for a peaceful resolution of this crisis. But I am as certain as I can be that the course of action which the Government proposes tonight is the right one.

And where we are is where we are. We all wish that the world was different; that Saddam Hussein had actively, fully and immediately complied with his disarmament obligations. But he has not done so. And no one today, just as no one in New York in four Security Council meetings, which I attended - and however much they may have resisted the conclusion - has ever had the thought in their head, still less the words in the mouth, to be able to claim that Saddam is in that full and immediate compliance required of him.

So what are the responsibilities placed on us.

We have first, clear duties to our troops in the field. I do not claim this as a conclusive argument - of course not - but I do say that if our troops go into battle, those young men and women - constituents of every member of this House - need to know, not that this motion has scraped through, nor that some here have willed the end but not the means, but that they have the fullest conceivable support from each one of us.

And then there are our responsibilities which lie at the very heart of this debate - namely whether we seek the exile of Saddam Hussein, and if that fails, his disarmament by force. For me, now, there is no other alternative - and nothing I have heard today seriously suggests otherwise.

I have already been over this question of containment. But let me repeat - containment is not the policy set out in 1441. Containment failed when the inspectors had to leave in 1998.

We first had to resort to Desert Fox to set back Iraqi WMD facilities.

Then in December 1999 there was UNSCR 1284, an attempt to offer Iraq a new way to peaceful disarmament, while containing the Iraqi threat. Months of negotiation, a new inspection regime. But three Permanent Members failed to support the resolution; Saddam said no; no inspectors were allowed to return; sanctions eroded and containment was left weaker than ever. And the world did nothing.

Until that is last year, and President Bush's speech to the United Nations on September 12 inviting the UN to reconsider its approach to Iraq.

The UN embraced that invitation: what it agreed, encapsulated in 1441, was not containment, but a realisation that containment, and the exhortation of Saddam Hussein had run their course and had failed. In their place there was a new strategy - for the active disarmament of the regime backed by the credible threat of force, a threat which if it is to be credible has to involve the actual use of force if the threat itself failed.

As Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Security Council when 1441 was passed, there was indeed 'no automaticity' about the use of force: it was entirely conditional - conditional on Saddam Hussein's - compliance or otherwise with the resolution. In the event of Saddam's non-compliance, a process was set out - a process which we have followed in its spirit and to the letter - a clear definition of a further material breach - discussion in the Council - then serious consequences.

Iraq is in further material breach - we have had the discussions - many ambassadorial meetings of the Security Council; four at Ministerial level - and Saddam has still not got the point.

In the debate today, some have said we should have shown more flexibility; we should have offered more time. We did both, we offered great flexibility - and clarity - about the terms of the ultimatum, as my RHF the Prime Minister spelt out. We also said - I said - to our Permanent 5 colleagues that if the only issue between us and them over the ultimatum was more time than the 10 days we had allowed, of course we could negotiate more time.

But no country which has asked for more time has been prepared to say how much longer before time runs out. None of them is prepared to issue an ultimatum. In reality they are not asking for more time they are asking for time without end.

The fact is this. Saddam will not disarm peacefully. He will not. We can take 12 more days, 12 more weeks, 12 more years. He won't disarm. We have no need to stare into the crystal ball for this. We know it from the book, from his record.

He was given his final opportunity in 1441, and he has failed to take it.

So then there is a choice. The choice is this. Either we leave Saddam where he is, armed and emboldened, an even bigger threat to his country, his region and to international peace and security, or we disarm him by force. Believe me, Mr Speaker, I wish there were some other way. I have worked for months for another way; but it is not there and it will not be there.

Mr Speaker, I impugn the motives of no one in this House. The different positions which have been taken all come from the best, not the worst, of intentions. But as elected Members of Parliament, we all know that we cannot just be judged on our intentions, but on the results, the consequences of our decisions. The consequences of the amendment will be neither the containment, nor the disarmament of Saddam's regime, but an undermining of the authority of the United Nations, the rearmament of Iraq, a worsening of the regimes tyranny, an end to the hopes of millions in Iraq, and a message to tyrants elsewhere that defiance pays.

Yes, there will of course be consequences if the House approves the Government's motion. Our forces will almost certainly be involved in military action. Some may be killed: so too will innocent Iraqi civilians. But far fewer Iraqis in the future will be maimed, or tortured or killed by the Saddam regime, the Iraqi people will begin to enjoy the freedom and prosperity which should be theirs, the world will become a safer place, and above all the essential authority of the United Nations will have been upheld.

I urge the House to vote with the Government in the lobbies tonight.

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Search WMD profiles Iraqi entities of concern Iraq's suppliers UN documents Government documents Controlled items Perspectives	DEBATE ON IRAQ 'VOTING ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE' STATEMENT GIVEN BY JACK STRAW UK FOREIGN SECRETARY UK HOUSE OF COMMONS UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE March 18, 2003 Mr Speaker, In a few minutes we will vote on the most critical issue that has been before this House, certainly at any time in the twenty-four years that I have been privileged to represent my constituency of Blackburn. Yes, I have been here before when military action by British troops has been debated. But never before - prior to such action - has the House been asked on a substantive motion for its explicit support for the use of our armed forces. Today it is. It is what the House sought: more important, in a modern democracy, it is constitutionally proper. But the very fact of the substantive motion and its amendment before the House tonight places on each of us a heavy responsibility, which as individual Members we will carry for years to come. I do not say that for any of us the choice is an easy one. I said in the last debate on 26 February that this was the most difficult issue I have ever had to deal with: that is more true today. Where we are is not, of course, a position in which I wanted this country, the Government or the House to be placed: like my RHF the Prime Minister and many others I have worked for months for a peaceful resolution of this crisis. But I am as certain as I can be that the course of action which the Government proposes tonight is the right one. And where we are is where we are. We all wish that the world was different; that Saddam Hussein had actively, fully and immediately complied with his disarmament obligations. But he has not done so. And no one today, just as no one in New York in four Security Council meetings, which I attended - and however much they may have resisted the conclusion - has ever had the thought in their head, still less the words in the mouth, to be able to claim that Saddam is in that full and immediate compliance required of him. So what are the responsibilities placed on us. We have first, clear duties to our troops in the field. I do not claim this as a conclusive argument - of course not - but I do say that if our troops go into battle, those young men and women - constituents of every member of this House - need to know, not that this motion has scraped through, nor that some here have willed the end but not the means, but that they have the fullest conceivable support from each one of us. And then there are our responsibilities which lie at the very heart of this debate - namely whether we seek the exile of Saddam Hussein, and if that fails, his disarmament by force. For me, now, there is no other alternative - and nothing I have heard today seriously suggests otherwise. I have already been over this question of containment. But let me repeat - containment is not the policy set out in 1441. Containment failed when the inspectors had to leave in 1998. We first had to resort to Desert Fox to set back Iraqi WMD facilities. Then in December 1999 there was UNSCR 1284, an attempt to offer Iraq a new way to peaceful disarmament, while containing the Iraqi threat. Months of negotiation, a new inspection regime. But three Permanent Members failed to support the resolution; Saddam said no; no inspectors were allowed to return; sanctions eroded and containment was left weaker than ever. And the world did nothing. Until that is last year, and President Bush's speech to the United Nations on September 12 inviting the UN to reconsider its approach to Iraq. The UN embraced that invitation: what it agreed, encapsulated in 1441, was not containment, but a realisation that containment, and the exhortation of Saddam Hussein had run their course and had failed. In their place there was a new strategy - for the active disarmament of the regime backed by the credible threat of force, a threat which if it is to be credible has to involve the actual use of force if the threat itself failed. As Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Security Council when 1441 was passed, there was indeed 'no automaticity' about the use of force: it was entirely conditional - conditional on Saddam Hussein's - compliance or otherwise with the resolution. In the event of Saddam's non-compliance, a process was set out - a process which we have followed in its spirit and to the letter - a clear definition of a further material breach - discussion in the Council - then serious consequences. Iraq is in further material breach - we have had the discussions - many ambassadorial meetings of the Security Council; four at Ministerial level - and Saddam has still not got the point. In the debate today, some have said we should have shown more flexibility; we should have offered more time. We did both, we offered great flexibility - and clarity - about the terms of the ultimatum, as my RHF the Prime Minister spelt out. We also said - I said - to our Permanent 5 colleagues that if the only issue between us and them over the ultimatum was more time than the 10 days we had allowed, of course we could negotiate more time. But no country which has asked for more time has been prepared to say how much longer before time runs out. None of them is prepared to issue an ultimatum. In reality they are not asking for more time they are asking for time without end. The fact is this. Saddam will not disarm peacefully. He will not. We can take 12 more days, 12 more weeks, 12 more years. He won't disarm. We have no need to stare into the crystal ball for this. We know it from the book, from his record. He was given his final opportunity in 1441, and he has failed to take it. So then there is a choice. The choice is this. Either we leave Saddam where he is, armed and emboldened, an even bigger threat to his country, his region and to international peace and security, or we disarm him by force. Believe me, Mr Speaker, I wish there were some other way. I have worked for months for another way; but it is not there and it will not be there. Mr Speaker, I impugn the motives of no one in this House. The different positions which have been taken all come from the best, not the worst, of intentions. But as elected Members of Parliament, we all know that we cannot just be judged on our intentions, but on the results, the consequences of our decisions. The consequences of the amendment will be neither the containment, nor the disarmament of Saddam's regime, but an undermining of the authority of the United Nations, the rearmament of Iraq, a worsening of the regimes tyranny, an end to the hopes of millions in Iraq, and a message to tyrants elsewhere that defiance pays. Yes, there will of course be consequences if the House approves the Government's motion. Our forces will almost certainly be involved in military action. Some may be killed: so too will innocent Iraqi civilians. But far fewer Iraqis in the future will be maimed, or tortured or killed by the Saddam regime, the Iraqi people will begin to enjoy the freedom and prosperity which should be theirs, the world will become a safer place, and above all the essential authority of the United Nations will have been upheld. I urge the House to vote with the Government in the lobbies tonight.