FCO: Straw Debates on Iraq and the UN

'A MOMENT OF CHOICE FOR IRAQ AND THE UNITED NATIONS'

OPENING SPEECH BY JACK STRAW
UK FOREIGN SECRETARY

UK HOUSE OF COMMONS

UK FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

February 26, 2003

Mr Speaker, I beg to move the motion in the name of my RHF the Prime Minister and other RHFs.

This motion means what it says. It is not an endorsement of military action by UK forces. No decision to deploy British forces in action has yet been taken. Subject to the safety of our forces, we do intend to put any decision to the House; it is as much in the Government's interest as this House's to do so before the start of any hostilities. There will of course be oral statements to this House on the business of the Security Council, and a full opportunity to debate and vote on the outcome of proceedings on any second resolution.

Let me commend to the House the Command Paper 'Iraq' which I presented yesterday. This contains the reports of Dr Blix and Dr El-Baradei, statements on the Iraq crisis by the EU and by NATO, my statements at three recent Security Council meetings, and above all the full texts of thirteen principal Security Council Resolutions on Iraq passed since August 1990.

The situation we face is plainly grave. It is a matter which, across a range of beliefs, arouses great concern and anxiety. So in this debate I want to answer what I think are the central and continuing questions in people's minds.

The best answer to this question is to be found in the 42 pages of text of the 13 Security Council Resolutions which form the first section of this Command Paper. There we see paragraph by paragraph the exceptional danger posed by Iraq, and its continued defiance of the United Nations.

29 November 1990 – SCR 678 offers Iraq a 'final opportunity' to comply - which it fails to take.

3 April 1991 – SCR 687 gives Iraq until 18 April 1991 to make a full declaration of the 'locations, amount and types' of all chemical and biological weapons and of all medium and long range ballistic missiles. That resolution bars Iraq from ever developing biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.

On and on the Resolutions go – SCR 688 'gravely concerned' about the repression of the civilian population in many parts of Iraq; on to 1994 949 'condemns military deployments by Iraq in the direction of the border with Kuwait' three years after the invasion.

1999, nine years after the invasion of Kuwait, SCR 1284 establishes a further inspection regime … 'as a result of Iraq's failure to implement the Security Council Resolutions fully'. Iraq flatly and completely refuses to comply.

And then to last November. SCR 1441 recognised 'the threat which Iraq's non-compliance with Council Resolutions and its proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and long range missiles poses to international peace and security', and gave Iraq its 'final opportunity to comply'.

So, for the United Nations, the answer to 'Why Iraq?' question is very clear. Iraq is the only country in such serious and multiple breach of mandatory UN obligations. It is the only country in the world to have fired missiles at five of its neighbours, the only country in history to have used chemical weapons against its own people, and the only country in the region which has invaded two of its neighbours in recent years.

And these Resolutions, twelve years of them, also help us answer the question which follows - 'Why now?'

Saddam's aim is that 'now' will never arrive. His tactics all along have been to prevaricate in the hope that by exploiting people's natural anxieties about military action he can string out the process forever, and keep his arsenal for good.

Let us look at the recent evidence. On 10 September last year, Iraq declares, and I was there in the General Assembly when they said it, that it will never ever readmit weapons inspectors under any circumstances. Then President Bush speaks to the UN General Assembly. Four days later, Iraq says that it will after all readmit weapons inspectors, but makes its offer subject to 19 spurious conditions. Fortunately, those were rejected. There was two months of intense negotiations in the Security Council. In response, the international community did unite, 1441 was passed and the Security Council agreed to back its diplomacy with the credible threat of force. Inspectors finally entered Iraq on 27 November looking for full, active and immediate cooperation from Iraq.

As a result, as Dr Blix himself indicates, in 15 weeks the Inspectors have not been able to close a single outstanding issue. No answers to what happened to the 8,500 litres of anthrax, the 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agent, the 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, the 1.5 tons of the completely deadly VX nerve agent or the 6,500 chemical bombs identified by Dr Blix on 27 January. Intimidation of scientists and their families so they do not give full evidence has continued.

Mr Speaker, the next question is about more time and more inspections. But Saddam has not shown that he is ready to break with the past. And that's exactly what Dr Blix said today, at the moment it is not even clear whether the Iraqis really want to cooperate. In these circumstances, in the absence of active and immediate Iraqi co-operation, more time will not achieve anything of substance. Nor without that active co-operation can it be a question of more Inspectors. It took just nine inspectors to verify the disarmament of South Africa's nuclear weapons programme at the end of apartheid, because South Africa was co-operating. Why? It didn't take 12 years, it didn't take endless security council resolutions, it took 3 years, 9 inspectors and one resolution. Why? Because South Africa was complying with the inspectors.

It is critical that, in respect of Iraq, we all accept one reality above all, which is that what grudging concessions on process there have been from Saddam have been secured only because of the military build-up. What is the difference between the circumstances now and the circumstances when resolution 1284 was agreed at the end of 1999, the resolution that set up the organisation of weapons inspectors, UNMOVIC? There is some difference in terms of the powers of the weapons inspectors. But the only significant, material difference is that, back at the end of 1999, the world said, 'Let us try giving them more time. Let us try by a completely peaceful route to secure the disarmament of Iraq. Let us plead with the Iraqis to do the decent thing. Let us impose some sanctions, too, and hope that they will work.' Saddam's answer was to slam the door in the face of the international community. The only reason for the difference between Saddam's refusal to co-operate with one dot or comma in resolution 1284 and his very reluctant co-operation on some process today, his statement that he will co-operate, is the build-up of the credible threat of force, something clearly recognised by the United Nations charter.

Mr Speaker, the next question is why do we need a second Resolution now? Resolution 1441 required Iraq's full, active and immediate compliance, as indeed 687 passed 12 years ago. 15 weeks after 1441, Saddam's response has been neither full, nor active, nor immediate. He has not complied. Not a single member of the Security Council says otherwise. Not one.

In place of active voluntary co-operation we have had a string of cynically timed concessions calculated to divide and to delay. We saw more token concessions last night. Iraq has now told Dr Blix that it has - and I quote - 'found' a bomb apparently containing biological agents. Some will be tempted to regard this as evidence that Saddam is being successfully contained, that the inspectors should be given endless time. This latest 'find' is simply the same old game of dribbling out small concessions at the last minute. It is ludicrous for the Iraqi regime to talk of 'finding' WMD, as if it were someone else who had made a 12,000 word declaration claiming the country had no weapons of mass destruction.

The conclusion we ought to be drawing from this overnight admission by Iraq is that we are right to say that it does have weapons of mass destruction, that it has lied about them, that it has tried to hide them, and that it is determined to keep them, behind a charade of cynical concessions. And unless we bring this game to a halt, it will go on as long as Saddam wants. I won't be surprised if, by the end of the week, Saddam is offering concessions on the proscribed al-Samoud missiles, in the hope once again of playing for time.

But if the words 'final opportunity', from operative paragraph two of resolution 1441, have any meaning it is that this time we must not let Saddam lure the international community into endless indecision. 1441 called for disarmament 'immediately'. We have waited 110 days already, which is stretching the meaning of 'immediately' to breaking point.

I ask our friends in France and Germany, who share our goal of Iraqi disarmament, and who fully support 1441, why Saddam is more likely to cooperate actively, fully and immediately in the further 120 days which they now propose, than he has been in the last 110 days. What does he need 120 days for? To have another look for the weapons he says he hasn't got, in case there was something he has overlooked? To search the homes of scientists for the incriminating papers he ordered them to hide there? To tell those scientists to go to interviews to tell the truth that he has instructed and intimidated them to conceal?

No, he would use a further 120 days to bring the authority of the United Nations lower week by week, to tie the weapons inspectors in knots, and to create further divisions within the international community. We know this is what he will do, because it is what he has always done.

Worse, this delay would give Saddam the clearest possible signal that his strategy is succeeding. It would tell him that the international community lacks the will to disarm him. And it would tell all those who threaten our security that Saddam Hussein has broken the United Nations as an instrument for defending peace through the force of international law.

Mr Speaker, the next question is why not persist with the policy of containment rather than contemplate military action? After all, some argue Iraq has not invaded any of its neighbours or used chemical and biological weapons over the last 12 years - and that these weapons have either been destroyed or do not present a sufficient threat to Iraq's neighbours or to the wider world to justify the use of force to remove them, if Saddam refuses to do so peacefully.

I understand this argument but I don't agree with it. But let no one be under any illusions. The policy of containment is not the policy of disarmament as set out in resolution 1441 nor any of the preceding resolutions. There can be no stable, steady state for Iraq unless it is properly disarmed nor for the region and the international community. What may appear to be containment to us, is rearmament for Saddam.

We do not need to speculate on this, because we have actually witnessed it. For a de facto policy of containment existed between 1998 and 2002 following the effective expulsion of inspectors by Iraq. And far from keeping a lid on Saddam's ambitions, that period allowed him to rebuild his horrific arsenal, his chemical and biological weapons, and the means of delivering them against his enemies at home and abroad. UNMOVIC inspectors chart in their recent reports before the House how Iraq has refurbished prohibited equipment which had previously been destroyed by UNSCOM, including rocket motor casting chambers and chemical processors. UNMOVIC has also found that Iraq has used the four-year absence of inspectors, used the so-called period of containment, to build a missile test stand capable of testing engines with over four times the thrust of the already prohibited al-Samoud 2 missile. All this happened during containment.

Mr Speaker, thankfully the so-called policy of containment ended on 8 November last year. Containment requires a degree of trust in Saddam which we cannot risk and runs contrary to all the evidence. And it means leaving Saddam as a standing example that defiance pays.

We cannot allow Saddam further time and space to strengthen his capabilities and further to rearm. Only disarmament - the aim of all these UNSC resolutions - can deal with this issue.

Mr Speaker, let me turn to the next question. I am often asked – isn't the West guilty of double standards, especially in relation to Israel/Palestine.

I accept, as does the Prime Minister, that there has been substance in this charge; and the perception of double standards extends well beyond the Arab and Islamic world.

We deal with this charge, however, not by ignoring outstanding United Nations obligations, but working even harder to see all of them implemented. The key ones on Israel/Palestine – 242, 338, 1397 - impose obligations on three sets of parties – on the Palestinians to end terrorism, on the Arab countries to end support for terrorism and to recognise the State of Israel, on Israel fully to cooperate in the establishment of a viable State of Palestine with borders broadly based on those of 1967. In difficult circumstances, we are working actively to implement this United Nations policy, including the early publication of the Roadmap.

But it must also never be forgotten that the obligations on Saddam are singular, unilateral, not for negotiation by him. We increase, not undermine, respect for the authority of the UN as a whole – and the prospects of a peace settlement in the Middle East – if we implement fully the Resolutions on Iraq, and do not shy away from their consequences.

Mr Speaker, international terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction are the crucial strategic questions of our time. Our answer to these threats will determine the stability of the world for decades to come. This is an awesome responsibility. It calls for courageous leadership. And it requires the vision and foresight to act decisively and – if necessary – with military force.

Once Saddam's invasion of Kuwait had been turned back by the international community, with our agreement, put on hold the military option, preferring of course to resolve the continuing crisis peacefully, first through weapons inspections and then from December 1998 through a policy of containment. But neither of these approaches has worked.

Following the adoption of SCR 1441, Saddam has now to be under no illusions that there will be no further resolutions calling for containment, no further attempts to tinker at the margins rather than to remove his weapons.

This has to be a moment of choice for Saddam and for the Iraqi regime. But it is also a moment of choice for the United Nations. As I told the Security Council on 5 February, the UN's pre-war predecessor, the League of Nations, had the same fine ideals as the United Nations. But the League failed because it could not create actions from its words; it could not back diplomacy with the credible threat and, where necessary, the use of force. So small evils went unchecked, tyrants became emboldened, then greater evils were unleashed. At each stage good men and women said 'not now' - wait; the evil is not big enough to challenge. Then before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge. We had slipped slowly down a slope, never noticing how far we had gone until it was too late.

Mr Speaker, this is the hardest issue I've ever had to deal with. I know it causes great anxiety to the British people and to members of this House. It does to all of us. But this issue, of what we do about tyrannical states with poisons gases and nerve agents and viruses and nuclear ambitions, and which defy international law and the principles of the United Nations will not go away: we have to face the issue; we have to give Saddam a categorical choice, and after 12 long years he has to give us his answer now.