FORUM WITH FRANCO FRANTTINI
ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

ITALIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

March 1, 2003

Rome. Neither is it wavering nor is it inconsistent. Italian foreign policy is playing an important role in the delicate game against Saddam Hussein. In a forum held at the Rome offices of “Il Sole 24 Ore” the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini, emphasised that the Italian mediation is not one between pro-American interventionist countries and the non-interventionists led by France and Germany. On the contrary, it is a real “political action” whose significance should be evaluated in the light of one element: of all the “major” players on the international scene, Italy is the only country without a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, Italy still manages to make its weight felt by laying its trump cards on the table: its role of cornerstone within Europe and the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, and its consolidated relations with many Arab countries.

“A Europe which counts is not a Europe which opposes the United States; a Europe which counts is a Europe which with a single voices convinces the United States or helps the United States to achieve a common objective. We feel that the best instrument for that is the UN Security Council because unilateral action would create problems.”

Frattini added that in the case of unilateral action, following the necessary parliamentary procedures, the United States would only be able to rely on the political support of Italy, and not on military support, although Italy would still be required to respect its commitments as a member of NATO.

Iraq has certainly created a breach within the European Union, and right on the eve of the Italian presidency which is set to begin with great expectations. The greatest of these is the signing of the Second Treaty of Rome, with the new constitution which is being prepared by the Convention led by Valery Giscard d’Estaing. Frattini admits that the Treaty will not be signed before May 2004, that is before the accession of the ten applicant countries. Nonetheless he has not abandoned the idea of giving symbolic value to the signing, and therefore does not rule out Rome being selected independently by the country holding the presidency at the auspicious moment.

With regard to the Italian “semester” there will be four main areas of action: firstly, the institutional reforms aimed at achieving, amongst other things, majority decisions, perhaps accompanied by an opt-out mechanism to safeguard national interests; secondly, the relaunching of cooperation with the southern Mediterranean countries; thirdly, the stabilisation of security and democracy in the Balkans; and fourthly, the relaunching of competitiveness on the basis of the guidelines set down at the Lisbon summit.

However, will the European Union be capable of making progress on issues of such importance following the breach caused by Iraq? Do the Franco-German and the Anglo-Spanish axes have the same aims? Regarding these questions Frattini is pragmatic: on certain key issues, such as Iraq, reaching common ground, as was achieved at the last European Council summit, will also be indispensable in the future. However, in general it will be possible to proceed “at variable geometries” with strengthened cooperation.

The Iraqi crisis risks dividing the United States and Europe as never before. At first Italy seemed more pro-American than other countries, then it appeared more mindful of regaining a united stance, whereas now Italy has assigned itself a role of mediation. Could you explain the precise role of Italian diplomacy in the Iraqi crisis?

Italian foreign policy cannot be defined a policy of mediation; I prefer to speak of “political action”. This is not merely a question of terminology. It means that Italy is fully involved in the search for a solution to the Iraqi crisis, despite not having a seat on the UN Security Council. We are seeking a solution, hopefully a peaceful one, as are the United States, Russia, China and the four European countries which are currently members of the UN Security Council. This is the firmest expression of foreign policy action in the strictest sense, and Italy is now a country which counts not only for the quantity but also for the quality of its actions.

But what does the Italian policy on Iraq precisely consist of?

Italy is currently implementing two lines of foreign policy action. The first regards the need to strengthen cohesion among European countries and between Europe and the United States. These are two cohesive forces which for fifty years have characterised our action, because Italy, together with Germany, is perhaps the only country to have been a convinced supporter of European integration and at the same time a friend of the Americans. And I feel that we can be legitimately satisfied with the outcome of the last European Council meeting held in Brussels when Italy, at fist alone and then with a unanimous vote, helped to have inserted into the final declaration the paragraph which identifies the peaceful solution as the aim, but does not exclude the use of force in extremis. Apart from the origin of this idea, the move managed to save Euro-Atlantic relations and European cohesion. That is why I stated to my French colleague Dominique de Villepin that giving the impression of antagonism between Euro-Atlantic relations and European cohesion should be avoided. A Europe which counts is not a Europe which opposes the United States; a Europe which counts is a Europe which with a single voices convinces the United States or helps the United States to achieve a common objective. We feel that the best instrument for that is the UN Security Council because unilateral action would create problems.

Then there is the relations with the Arab countries: is that the second line of action?

The second line is that which arises from our relations with the Arab countries, which clearly nobody can deny because it is not something which we have only just started. We have begun close relations with a number of Arab countries, both on the southern shores of the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. We have had contacts with Libya, between Berlusconi and Gheddafi and between our respective Foreign Ministers. There are contacts with Algeria and also with Tunisia. And of course there is the ongoing dialogue with all of the other Arab countries including Saudi Arabia, whose ambassadors I recently received at the Farnesina. Last, but certainly not least, there are our relations with Iran. On Wednesday Berlusconi and I received the Vice-President of the Iranian Parliament, Reza Khatami, the brother of the President of Iran and the leader of reformist party, who brought a personal message to the Italian government from the Iranian President. In all of these contacts we continually hear the same message: we are counting on Italy because you who are close to the Americans are able to convince them to avoid a unilateral attack, and because with a variety of instruments, amongst which European pressure, you are able to contribute to keeping the Arab world united.

The solution to the Palestinian crisis is linked to this line of action...

Indeed we were the ones to request the connection, which can be found in the conclusion of the Brussels summit, between a rapid solution of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and the Iraqi crisis. This is because we had received the following message from many Arab representatives: if preparations are made, even via the UN, for forced disarmament of Iraq, and at the same time no move is made for resuming peace talks, we Arabs will find ourselves in a weaker position. If, on the other hand, a blueprint is laid down for a cooling off of the territorial crisis, the Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authorities is nominated, the reform process proceeds, and the Israelis are persuaded that their policy of the colonies, which goes beyond the agreements, is dangerous, then all of this helps we Arabs to say that on the one hand there is a war with international legitimisation, while on the other there is a demonstration of good will.

Coming back to the UN, will it come to a second resolution which will make the use of force inevitable?

I don’t know, but there are some important points which need to be underlined. First of all, I am not at all surprised that the positions are so different, with the French memorandum on the one side and the Spanish-Anglo-American proposed resolution on the other.

Why?

Because given that the Council is the negotiating forum where the question must be addressed, it is logical that negotiations begin from different positions. Italy trusts that the final result will be shared and that a twofold proposal will emerge: the requirement by the inspectors to further tighten relations with Saddam Hussein demanding active cooperation which until now has been absent; the fulfilment in short time of the obligation to destroy the Samud missiles. One question remains: can the inspections continue indefinitely? The reply has already been given by the European Council: no, they cannot continue indefinitely.

A solution, therefore, which obviates the need for a second resolution, but which sets a deadline. Do you believe that it should be a Mediterranean country rather than Canada to put forward such a proposal?

I believe that all attempts at mediation are to be appreciated. The fact that it was Canada to make the proposal is in my opinion important: firstly because Canada is one of the G8 countries, and secondly because it offers the dimension of views held by countries very near to the United States which until now have not intervened.

But time for such mediation is short. Is it right to say that there are only two weeks left?

We are waiting on the latest report by the inspectors due in the first week of March. I feel that things must come to a crunch. The deadlines don’t depend on me. I also feel that we should have in mind the idea of a possible compromise.

The Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar, has asked the Americans to help Europe, allowing more men like Powell and less men like Rumsfield to speak. Is this also the stance of the Italian Government?

I cannot and do not intend to comment on the interview with Prime Minister Aznar, heaven forbid! I would just like to say that there is an objective problem of communication. There is the need to make public opinion understand that the alternative is not between peace and war, because everybody wants peace; everyone with common sense and all governments want peace. The alternative is in fact between a false peace in an unstable region with twelve years of non-fulfilled UN resolutions, and a stable peace which is the exclusive consequence of effective and total disarmament and respect for international law. We must do more, communicate better, in short we must succeed in better explaining this concept to our citizens.

If the Americans take unilateral action, what would be the Italian position?

Foreign policy is best not carried out on the basis of “ifs”, but in that case we could not guarantee military support. Political support is another thing. In the past it has already come to pass that the Premier has expressed “understanding for the difficult decision taken by our American friends.” With this formula the intent is that although Italy is not participating it does understand.

And what of the Italian pilots on the AWACS aircraft?

That is a NATO commitment and we cannot disregard it. The NATO Defence Planning Committee has made a decision, with the vote of Germany, and we must play our part. We have taken on the commitment that in the case of a United Nations resolution we will put the issue of a possible Italian military involvement to vote before parliament. If on the other hand the UN resolution is not passed, then Italy will only be able to offer political support which will still require parliamentary approval.

What has the government done to create a bipartisan consensus on the line of foreign policy in the Iraqi crisis?

In parliament we have registered, on the part of the opposition and with great dissatisfaction, an attitude of prejudicial closure, because there is not only one opposition, but many. This was perfectly clear when during the most recent debate (with voting) first Berlusconi and then I made an explicit appeal to the opposition to reach an agreement on the basis of the final declaration of the European Council. Well, not only the Communist Refoundation Party but also the Olive Tree Coalition voted against that resolution which entirely quoted the conclusions of the European Council. The Olive Tree Coalition voted against it and within the coalition the socialists of Boselli and others personally preferred to differ. A part of the Democrats of the Left voted in favour of the motion tabled by the Communist Refoundation Party and the supporters of Cossutta. In the face of this situation our prayer at least of abstaining did not have a positive outcome.

How much weight will public opinion have in deciding whether action should be taken in the context of the UN, and how influential will be the position of the Church?

I believe that the consensus of public opinion lies with the UN, and I am not speaking only as Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also as a citizen. I believe that the best line of action is to confirm 1) that the UN are credible, 2) that the UN must decide, and 3) the solution must be found within the UN system. Therefore, the idea of “no to the war without ifs or buts” can be contradicted on important grounds. As a Catholic I interpret affirmations such as “we will not be influenced by the words of the Pope” with a very special meaning: we are in the presence of a message from such a high source of moral authority that it cannot be manipulated by one side or another. It is clear that the Pope has the duty to state that war is unacceptable; he also used very similar words during the crisis in Kosovo.

You reminded us that you are a Catholic. Will you be fasting on 5 March? As a Catholic I can fast, but as I know that if I were to state it publicly, somebody would try to exploit it, I prefer not to answer. Minister Frattini, will there be a war? I hope not. But the answer lies in the hands of Saddam Hussein. What are the priorities for the semester of the Italian presidency of the EU?

The first objective is the reform of the European institutions. It is a vital area, because if the project of enlargement-unification is not accompanied by a process of institutional reforms, there is the risk of offering our citizens with a 25-member European Union which will have enormous decision-making difficulties given that there are already enough difficulties with 15 members.

And the other priorities?

The second priority involves a determined relaunching of the Euro-Mediterranean policy, because the European construction in the Nordic-Baltic region should be balanced by relaunching the Barcelona process. The third priority is the confirmation of the process of security and democratic stabilisation in the Western Balkans, another strategic area for Italy. Our fourth priority will be the relaunching of competitiveness according to the guidelines set down at Lisbon which we intend to broaden to include a new area: particular attention for the weaker categories.

Won’t areas such as foreign policy or common security risk becoming the first victims of the Iraqi crisis? Isn’t it unrealistic to speak of majority voting?

The efforts that I have been making, for example with the initiative of a common policy document of the six founding members on reform, aims at establishing that we must all move together, despite our different views on the issues Iraq, reform, the Mediterranean and competitiveness. And in my talks with the French and the Germans I have not found closure at all, but rather great openness. With regard to foreign policy, for some time now I have been in favour of the so-called “double hat” option: a single figure who is a member of the Commission, perhaps the vice-president with delegated responsibilities for external relations, and at the same time high representative of the Union for international policy. Of course, I am aware that this figure will have to deal with a 25-member European Council where it will not be easy to understand when an issue can be put to a majority vote or not.

How can the question be resolved?

There is a solution, which still needs to be looked into. In the case of majority voting there would be an insurmountable reserve of priority national interest. One or more countries could make use of a kind of veto, even though the issue in question should be decided with majority voting.

A veto or an opt-out?

Some envision that cases of absolute and priority national interest could give rise to an opt-out. Others foresee a veto, that is an absolute condition which would obstruct majority voting by the other countries.

The discussion on the amendments to the draft Constitution has begun in Brussels. The amendments include the proposals of Deputy Premier Fini. Are they shared by the whole government?

While Italy aims at a balance between the three main institutions – the Parliament, the Commission and the Council – we are convinced that in the end a comprise will have to be reached. And this will need to take into account two requirements: on the one hand guaranteeing the balance between the three institutions, and on the other avoiding the overlapping of responsibilities.

Between giving all the power to the Commission and maintaining a significant role of the Council, what is the Italian position?

We are not in favour of a solution which sees an imbalance towards the Commission, but neither are we for a purely intergovernmental model which reserves functions of direction, control and action for the Council. A half-way point needs to be found.

How do you judge the Franco-German proposals?

The Franco-German document has many interesting elements, for example, the proposal of a president of the Council with a longer mandate instead of the position of six months as it is now. Clearly, a doubling-up of structures with respect to he Commission is not to be considered; if that were the case the protests of the supporters of the purely community model would be founded. A possible half-way point, therefore, could consist of first limiting the competences of the Council and the Commission in order to avoid the overlapping of their responsibilities.

Then there is the need to find a balance between the large countries and the smaller countries…

That is a political and not a technical problem. To solve it the role of the founding members, which include three large and three small countries, could prove fundamental, because for 50 years they have had the same shared values and the same aim of broadening consensus.

Do you agree on the insertion in the Constitution of a reference to the Christian values of Europe?

The enlargement of the European Union is taking place on the basis of shared values. And among the shared values of this enlarged Union is there, or is there not, the long Judaic-Christian tradition, or according to others the long tradition of religiousness? The absence of all reference to these values would be an offence: I state this as a Catholic, but with the conviction nonetheless that religious values do not damage the principle of the lay State.

We are the only ones, together with the British, to propose the elimination of all reference to the federation of nation-states reiterated by France and Germany. Isn’t this, together with the cancellation of federalism, in contrast to the affirmation of continuity of Italian policy?

This comprehensibly critical observation fails to recognise that there are other amendments which go well beyond those of our partners on issues of common foreign and defence policy, or on subsidiarity.

The principle of subsidiarity is however being turned on its head.

That’s true, but on a more advanced basis which foresees the involvement of the Parliament. Italy is the only European country to propose paying special attention to the sub-national level, going so far as to have written “in respect of the special nature” between region and region, entity and entity. Having eliminated the adjective “federal” does not mean contradicting the community vision whatsoever. Instead, it means underlining, and perhaps more effectively, the concept of a union of states and peoples. There is then a new vocation, which is widely shared not only by the British, according to which the identity of the nation-state sits side by side the Community. And the enlargement to a 25-member Union has brought the problem to a head, because the new members demand the complete respect for their national identity.

In view of the unresolved issues will it still be possible to respect the deadlines established for the Convention? Is the aim of signing the Treaty during the Italian Presidency still realistic?

I wouldn’t be surprised if there were a thousand amendments. As President Amato clearly stated, a significant thinning is foreseeable given that many of them are identical. For us the observation of the deadlines is nonetheless unavoidable, but for reasons that have nothing to do with our ambition of signing the Treaty in Rome. Let it be clear, the Treaty cannot be signed before 1 March 2004, that is, before the accession of the 10 applicant countries. Indicating Rome as the city for the signing of the Treaty has symbolic and historic value. We do not wish to force anybody’s hand and risk an unsatisfactory European Constitution. We want the deadlines to be observed because, if we go beyond May 2004, we will be drawing close to the European elections and the renewal of the Commission in October, and so calling the citizens of Europe to vote without telling them exactly for which model of Europe they will be voting. This would be the negation of the principle of transparency and of democratic legitimisation.

Therefore the possibility of the signing in Rome even after the end of the Italian semester?

Why not?

Isn’t it dangerous to think of a revision of the stability pact due to the consequences of a possible conflict in Iraq?

Indeed, I feel that it shouldn’t be mentioned: it isn’t on the agenda; Italy has not suggested it, Tremonti has been perfectly clear.

You mentioned the aims regarding competitiveness set down in Lisbon. Italy and Great Britain have signed two documents and there is a common perspective with Spain. Isn’t this a sign of the difficulties of achieving a common language in Europe?

No, it isn’t. With regard to Lisbon we have not just one but many viewpoints in common with France and Germany. Last Monday at the Council of General Affairs France and Great Britain presented a common process on the highly delicate issue of military intervention in the Balkans and proposed a joint action on European troop movements in Bosnia. Europe is characterised by a wealth of contributions, by the desire to find new ideas to bring to the negotiating table.

After Iraq is Italy closer to the core of founding members or the Anglo-Spanish axis? Or is Italy in favour of variable geometry?

Regarding Iraq a compromise had to be found between differing sensitivities, and we achieved a good result with the European Council. Regarding other issues, Europe has always functioned with variable geometry and will continue to do so. The model of strengthened cooperation is not at all new, as the Euro-zone demonstrates. Clearly, with regard to competitiveness and the labour market we have a number of common viewpoints with the Spanish and the British which were consolidated right from the beginning of the Berlusconi government. I believe in the importance of a system in which several sectors act as the driving force, and of a Europe which is then in agreement. The founding members can be a political driving force for reform, because they have fifty years of shared values behind them.

What have been the first reactions to the document advanced by the founding members? It would appear that the first draft received a rather cold reception.

It has been examined at the technical level. There is room for political movement to articulate the document of the founding members with regard to certain political proposals. I believe that is right.

Will there be a dual presidency?

No, because the aim is to express a willingness to relaunch political action and not to provide technical contributions nor to schematically state that we prefer the Franco-German solution or the Benelux solution.

In the event of a war against Iraq, what Europe will come out of the conflict? Who will guide it and what role will Italy be able to play?

In a 25-member European Union a model of variable geometry based on strengthened cooperation will be inevitable. Of course, the countries of the Euro-zone have a vested interested in strengthened cooperation in a number of sectors. In agricultural policy there will probably be a cross grafting of new members – Poland for example. Having said this, the new Europe is a Europe which will need to interact with the United States in synergy. And at a different level the same will have to take place with China and Russia. As an example of this, we have already decided to establish a permanent liaison committee with Russia during the semester of the Italian Presidency of the EU.