INTERVIEW WITH JOSCHKA FISCHER
GERMAN FEDERAL FOREIGN MINISTER

GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

August 21, 2003

Question (Fried/Kister): Mr Minister, from your point of view, what does the attack in Baghdad mean for developments in Iraq?

Answer (Fischer): The death of Sergio de Mello and all the others is a terrible loss for the United Nations and for us all. This murderous attack was directed not only at the UN, but against the international community as a whole. It harms the interests of the Iraqi people, whom the UN is, after all, in Iraq to help. At the same time, it makes clear the enormous challenges facing post-war Iraq. The task of stabilizing, bringing peace to and reconstructing Iraq is possibly proving larger than some previously thought. That is why we have always said it is in our own overriding interest that peace be restored in Iraq.

Does the Federal Government need to reconsider its position of not becoming militarily involved in Iraq?

Security Council Resolution 1483 clearly states that responsibility for maintaining stability in Iraq lies with the coalition of the United States and Britain. We would have liked to see the UN assigned a central role, but some of our partners held a different opinion. We must accept that.

Will German soldiers also not participate in the reconstruction of Iraq if there is a new UN mandate?

Since the end of the war, four new resolutions have already been adopted on Iraq. These resolutions, however, did not change the mandate regarding who is in charge of security. We are providing humanitarian aid, and we will continue to do so. Nor are we ruling out the possibility of providing other non-military aid. There is no question of military involvement.

Does Germany want to avoid any involvement in Iraq and use its engagement in Afghanistan as an alibi?

You only need an alibi if you are accused of something. However, I cannot see how this would apply to us. We have discussed the course of action in Iraq with our American partners. We had good reasons not to participate in this war. But this does not oblige us to pay any debts. Nor do we feel we are being put under any pressure to do so.

Still, it is conspicuous that you are currently expanding the German mission in Afghanistan. President Karzai and the Secretary-General's Special Envoy Brahimi have been demanding this for quite some time. Why are you now in favour of something you previously rejected?

First, because NATO has now taken over command of the ISAF mission in Kabul. The Federal Government has always demanded that we place an increased emphasis on the Alliance and on its extensive integration of military capacities. It was obvious that the principle of changing lead nations with alternating headquarters would eventually become a problem. Second, after the Iraq war the United States is again focusing more strongly on Afghanistan, and this is very helpful. Third, the building up of security structures in Afghanistan is taking longer than expected - nonetheless, the timetable of the Petersberg Summit must be adhered to.

This process is increasingly being called into question here in Germany.

I sometimes have the feeling that a few people have either not read the Agreement or are forgetful. Making changes to the Petersberg Agreement is not a matter for German domestic policy; this Agreement was drawn up and adopted by the parties to the conflict, the neighbouring states and the international community. It was the first consensus following more than 20 years of civil war, and it constituted a historic achievement of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy Brahimi. Moreover, demands for new concepts are not at issue here, rather the existing concepts must be implemented systematically and with determination.

But there is an impression that this consensus is not viable. Warlords, drug barons and terrorists are making many regions extremely dangerous.

What do you expect? A country cannot simply put behind itself more than 20 years of civil war. Please do not misunderstand me: we have considerable problems that the international community is very concerned about. But it is precisely for this reason that the implementation of the Petersberg Agreement is so important. We have successfully taken several important steps, while others lie ahead, i.e. the constitutional assembly this autumn and the elections next year. The reason behind the expansion of our engagement is to enable this process to take place. That is our political reasoning and the strategic perspective. The question of the legitimacy of President Karzai's government is of central importance to the development of the country. His mandate will end in the summer of 2004. Postponing the elections for too long would present the international community with problems which would be difficult to solve.

You want to democratize a society within a very short period of time that is not familiar with democracy.

We want to achieve political stability, as well as a relatively stable balance among the forces in Afghanistan, so that the country can have a peaceful future. We consider it important to extend the reach of the central government. By that I do not mean a centralized government. That is what existed under the Taliban, and their power was based on terror. Apart from that regime, a balance has always existed between the ethnic groups, religions and provinces. That is how it should be. But fair conditions must be established for elections, and regional reconstruction teams can make an important contribution to this. We are attempting to convince the UN to modify its ISAF mandate accordingly.

Why not extend the ISAF mission to the entire country?

You must always consider the question as to when help to stabilize a situation could be viewed as an occupation regime. And here, particularly in view of Afghanistan's history, we must be extremely cautious. Such a move would also require a military presence so large that it would be unrealistic.

People do not quite understand how a few hundred troops stationed in Kunduz are supposed to help bring peace to a country that is twice the size of Germany.

This is not about a hundred soldiers stationed in Kunduz. We consider the civilian reconstruction teams to be of prime importance. They are to be protected by a reasonably-sized but efficient military component. In addition: The Federal Armed Forces are not alone. Other nations will also be sending reconstruction teams.

We must rid ourselves of the thought that often dominates the political debate in Germany that we are going it alone here. It is not Germany's task to stabilize Afghanistan; we are making our national contribution to an international effort. Our role is perhaps only special due to the fact that the Afghans trust us. German development workers and soldiers are held in high regard there.

By sending more and more troops to Afghanistan, are we in danger of being drawn into another Vietnam, as your fellow party member Christian Ströbele said?

That is absurd. The comparison is also historically completely unfounded. And anyone with first-hand experience of the situation in Afghanistan will not say something like this again.

But what would happen if all of these efforts were to fail?

Since 11 September, the most important strategic challenge we face is the fight against Islamist terrorism. This is also, but not exclusively, a military task. That is why we have troops in Afghanistan. I have always said it is a long-term task. If we were to fail in our mission, we would have to withdraw. If we were to withdraw, the terror would return. That is why pulling out is not an option. That is the lesson we learned from 11 September. We cannot afford to be impatient. And that holds true not only for Afghanistan. We must take up challenges in the entire Islamic crisis zone from Indonesia to the Maghreb states. This is the strategic question facing European and Western security in the 21^st century. German policy must make its contribution to meeting these challenges.

It almost sounds like you are making a plea for interventionism.

That is too simplistic. You see, after the end of the Cold War there was a theory about the end of history. The opposite is the case. The Cold War only froze history and simplified it in a political sense by reducing it to an East-West conflict. Everything was subordinated to this confrontation. However, this model disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. We now have a three-tiered structure: on the upper tier are the major powers with their alliances, on the second tier we have regional powers and their conflicts, such as the Middle East or Kashmir conflict. And on the lower tier are the so-called failing states, countries with a collapsed internal structure. On 11 September, regional and global stability were attacked from this lower tier.

And what does this mean?

The actual threat we face will emerge if religious hate, national rivalry, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism unite. This threat is not aimed at the military occupation of our country, rather it is aimed at our open society. That is why we have no other option than to find new answers to this new type of threat. This requires a preventive policy, which should not be confused with a preemptive one. The essence of a preventive policy is the stabilization of regional crises, however not solely through military intervention, but rather in a much broader sense that includes all aspects of social development. We must help break down blockades to modernization. That is my comprehensive concept of security.