FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

March 27, 2003

Q. - Do you agree that the disarmament process was only ongoing and effective in the year 2003 because of a threat of force and because of a presence of US forces in the region ? And, secondly, do you agree that once a situation is created, for whatever good reason in the Security Council, where different States clearly view the problem differently, and where there is no prospect of authorizing the use of force, at that point there is no reason for the adversary to comply any more with a disarmament process or, at any rate, no reason to accede to all the demands that have been clearly spelt out in 1441 ?

THE MINISTER - Of course my personal feeling on the way we've gone through this UNSCR 1441 makes it clear that since the beginning, there have been some ambiguities in the different positions. But one thing was clear at the beginning: everybody was seeking, and trying to get a peaceful disarmament of Iraq. At the same time there was an increasing presence, military presence, in the region - and I must make the distinction, which is important, between putting pressure on a country by a military presence, and preparing war. It was clear at the turn of the year that we were switching from pressure to the preparation of war. I remember that when I went to Washington for the meeting of 20 January which we had asked for on terrorism, on the 18th there had been a second sign of the mobilization of the American army. From the contacts we had at the beginning of the year, directly with the White House or with US departments, it was quite clear that the determination to go to war was very, very strong. And we thought that if the "end of the game" for inspections, i.e. for peaceful disarmament, was the end of the year, which was in a couple of weeks, we had to try our best during this period to increase the efficiency and the capacity of the inspectors. Because we thought that not only the Iraq crisis was at stake, but also the capacity of the UN and the inspectors to face, tomorrow, all the crises of proliferation. We thought that this tool, the inspections, was very important if we wanted not to be in the situation of using force again in a different situation. So what was at stake was, of course, the Iraq situation, but much more: the capacity to build a real tool for fighting proliferation.

Up to a point I agree, of course - and we have said it all along - that military pressure is very important. But before military pressure, there was something very important also - and maybe we should remember it because it's one of the key elements of the efficiency of the international community: it was the fact that when we decided on this UNSCR 1441 we achieved unanimity. I remember that during the whole process, last month, the fact that we decided to have - and it was a French demand - transparent and open ministerial meetings in the UN with the reports of the inspectors, was putting a lot of pressure also. So you are right: on the ground having a military pressure was important, and having this system of meetings every two or three weeks to look into Iraq's compliance and how they were dealing with disarmament in the ballistic, nuclear and chemical spheres was also putting a lot of pressure.

But, of course, when you change the nature of the pressure and when you really prepare for war, then you begin to go on an automatic path, and we have always refused the automatic use of force. We thought that collective responsibility was needed if you wanted, at each stage, to adapt your strategy. We said it from the beginning, on 7 September, when the French president gave an interview to the New York Times, and inspired the way we conducted our negotiation for the drafting of 1441. We said there were going to be two stages, one of inspections : as long as the inspections work we are going to be in the inspections phase - and we thought till the end that we were in the inspections phase -, and we said that if we reached a deadlock, if the inspectors told us "we cannot work any more", if the majority of the Council was thinking that as well, that we would have to change strategy. At that point we would, of course, have been convinced, and we might have been ready to study other options.

You have to face the facts: everybody in the Security Council, not counting the three or four countries that decided to stick to the logic of ultimatum, nobody believed that a full chance was given to the inspectors. Nobody. That's why we have such a situation in the Council. And secondly, when everybody was listening to the inspectors' regular reports, we could all see that progress was being made. So you see, you have to take into account the fact that the awareness of the international community is very important. The military timetable was going faster than this awareness, than this conviction of the international community and of the security Council.

Q. - Monsieur le Ministre, I just want to ask you a question about your immediate dilemma about Iraq. On the one hand, France has said clearly that you don't want any resolution which legitimizes the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq - you said that in the context of unlocking the Oil-for-Food assistance for Iraq -, and on the other, you said clearly, so has Tony Blair and others, that the administration of Iraq must come quickly under the UN. It seems to me that these two goals of French policy are somewhat contradictory and conflict, and isn't it the case that in the end what you have to accept is a kind of de facto, if not "de-euro", endorsement by the UN of what's happened ?

THE MINISTER - Well, first I'd like to say that this is not just the French position, it is the position of, I would say, all the international community, in the Security Council. Everybody agrees that we need to have this resolution on oil for food, everybody agrees that we should not legitimize the use of force because it has been the long-standing position of the majority of the Security Council, and there is no point in going back, and we all think that it is in the interest of the world community, interest of the UN, interest of everybody, including the US and your country, to have an administration of Iraq by the UN. Because if you don't have a legitimate body which is going to take responsibility for what's going on and organizing the future of Iraq politically - I make the distinction between the war period in which of course the forces that are there must take responsibility for what's going on, and the aftermath - I believe it is crucial for the security even of the American and British troops on the ground, to have a legitimate body, like the UN, taking responsibility in the eyes of the Iraqis, in the eyes of the Arab world, in the eyes of the world community.

We all know the history of Iraq and, in this country you know maybe better than everyone else the problem of the unity of Iraq, the problem of "communautarisme", the problem of clashes between groups and faiths, it is very, very difficult to maintain unity. It's a very steep challenge and I'm convinced that the aftermath of the war is going to be a very difficult period. So when we say we need to have the UN taking responsibility for the reconstruction, we think this, not because we'll have to share tomorrow some kind of Eldorado named Iraq, but because we think that there are so many problems and insecurity in the region. Many people were saying before the war "the Arab street does not exist", we can see what is happening today. We have to take into account the reality, and it is only by facing reality that we can be sure of taking the right decision and for the reconstruction, I think the international community should be united. The UN should be fully involved, because it is a major factor for the success of the aftermath, and a global security concern for all of us.

Q. - I'm sure the aspirations that you've spelt out will find very common ground. The problem that I think many people looking in will be wanting to ask you is the absolutely practical steps that you, as France, and we perhaps as Europe, can take in the immediate aftermath of the war to recreate this relationship that you spoke about. And many of us cannot see any likelihood of the United States ceding control of Iraq to the United Nations at all quickly, and that is going to make for more division. What are the practical steps ? Can you suggest how it would look, I mean, after all your president and the president of the United States have not spoken together for weeks if not months ? The breakdown is more complete than any time in our living memory. So what are the steps ? What is it going to look like ? What is the repair afterwards ? How are you going to go about it ? Because surely the United States is travelling in a different direction from the one that you've spelt out, and travelling very fast.

THE MINISTER - I'd like first to say that, of course, we are in a very fast-moving situation, things are evolving every day and reality is something we have to consider first. Of course, there are the projects, we've seen how many projects there were in the United States, in the last month, for rebuilding and how they were seeing the future of Iraq and all these different goals that were discussed in the US inside and outside the Administration.

I believe it was very damaging for the unity of all our countries when we saw that the objective changed from the disarmament of Iraq to regime change and then the remodelling of the Middle East and democratization. I think we all share the goal of democracy, we all share the goal of stability of the region. But then at a certain point we have to face the reality of the situation, and my first concern is, of course, security : security of everybody, security against terrorism, security in the region. How are we going to be sure that all the persons involved, including the military involved on the ground are going to be safe ? Are they going to be safer with a US administration of Iraq, or safer with a UN administration ? This is the question, and what we are doing at this stage is asking questions.

I believe that we should also look back at what we know of this region, learn from experience. We have past experience of this kind of thing, and we know that even if we wish the Iraqi people to be happy about the liberation of their country, we know that at some point rejection happens, sometimes in very few weeks, sometimes in a few days. We have experienced this even when taking a legitimate attitude. We experienced it in Ivory Coast. We've been proposing solutions on Ivory Coast with all the political parties of Ivory Coast, backed by the legitimacy of the regional groups, ECOWAS, and with the support of the African Union and the UN, and even then, you see that things are difficult and there is a lot of misunderstanding. You can imagine [what it would be] in Iraq.

This is reality. I'm not saying that we should do this or that, I'm saying we should look for the safest way of working in Iraq. We are also saying that the way we are going to deal with it is going to have consequences not only in Iraq, not only for the region, but for the whole world. So, I believe that a very important role of the Security Council is to discuss. That's the first thing I said to my colleague Jack Straw : "Let's meet, let's discuss". That's what I said to Colin Powell "Let's discuss, let's work". Because if you work, then you are able to find out, with a little advance [warning], the kind of problems you may have to face. Our belief is that, in front of us there are so many problems, even after the war, that we have to make sure that the decisions we are going to take are the good ones. Of course, the first step is a humanitarian resolution, oil for food. I really think that on principles and on details, we must come to a solution very fast.

The second step is [to decide on] what kind of administration for Iraq. Of course as I have said, I believe that in wartime, security is the concern of the forces on the ground. But when we are in a different situation, first we must prepare for a political settlement, the political capacity of the Iraqis to take the future in their own hands. But in the meantime it is certain that the UN must have a key role in the region, again because of security, because of stability, because of its ability to make the synthesis, and address the needs of the Iraqis in the best way. I think that, in the world today, we must not forget that the problems of identity, the problems of culture, the problems of religion are the key problems. And I say, very solemnly in this institute, that very often in the last decade we've discussed the strategy of the world, forgetting about history, forgetting about culture, forgetting about religion, forgetting about the very important movements of the world.

Now we are facing the current situation and don't forget that when al-Qaida hit New York - a huge tragedy - one of the very important reasons behind the attack was the presence of foreigners in the Middle East. So we have to deal with a lot of caution, with a lot of respect with the way the region is organized. We cannot just think that we can go there and do whatever we want, no. We have to be very cautious, we have to maintain a very strong dialogue with the Arab world.

I believe it was one of the very great achievements, after 11 September, to be able to work with them. One of the very great achievements of the Beirut Summit at the beginning of 2002 was that the Arab world was united in proposing peace, and I think it was also a great achievement of UNSCR 1441 to have got Syria to support this resolution. We should not forget [the need] to work with all of these countries, and that's why France has taken the stand we've taken in the Security Council : we believe that we have to take into account the position of the rest of the world. We cannot define things and decide for the future of the world in an isolated and separated manner.

Q. - Here is a short question. You mentioned the possibility of some sort of UN administration of Iraq after the war. There are different versions of that, but I think experience has demonstrated to us that without having security we can achieve absolutely nothing. That of course raises the question of what is going to be this security presence and force that is going to make that possible? Who is going to command it? And who will provide the forces? I do not really expect you to be able to answer all of that, but these are clearly questions that need to be thought about at this stage as well, particularly if you talk of a UN administration, because it does raise all of these issues right away.

THE MINISTER - You are absolutely right. I believe that if we agree on the fact that the UN should have the political legitimacy of acting in Iraq, then we face other questions : how to coordinate the different actors ? How to organize security ? And of course the forces that are going to be present must be equally accepted. I think this should be under the umbrella, under the legitimacy of the UN. Then the rest is coordination, the rest is preparation, the rest is negotiation between all the parties and I believe that all the members of the world community should take responsibility for that, in doing reconstruction, in organizing a safer Iraq.

Q. - You have spoken, Minister, about a determination to make sure this is an international effort, that everything done in Iraq after the war is done on an internationally-agreed basis. Just yesterday Colin Powell the American Secretary of State was making it absolutely clear that America does not mean to let control of post-war Iraq out of its control, and they already have the names of the people they intend to put in place to at least facilitate the rehabilitation of Iraq after the war. Now if that is already so firmly in the Americans' minds, how is France, how is Britain, how is the international community going to change that ?

THE MINISTER - I believe that is what collective responsibility is all about. I believe that what we have to discuss is the feasibility, and that is why we are asking questions. Is it possible to have one country alone taking responsibility in a country like Iraq? Personally my answer is that it is very, very difficult to imagine such a possibility. Because of the risk, the risk for themselves, the risks involved in maintaining the unity, the sovereignty and the integrity of Iraq. That is what we are talking about. Which is the best way to maintain the security, unity, integrity and sovereignty of this country in a region where the tensions are going to be greater than ever?

This is why we believe we should go forward in the peace process, this is why we believe that it would have been a good idea to go faster in the peace process before going to war on Iraq. And now we have a common responsibility for that. We are going to face not only Iraq, but we are going to face the problems of the peace process and how to take the initiative again in this very region. I do not think one country can alone take full responsibility for that in the middle of such a region. Look at a map : it is a matter of history, it is a matter of geography, it is a matter of experience of this region. Personally, I have many doubts about the feasibility of doing it and I am ready to discuss it with everybody to find the best way. We have discussed this with our Russian colleagues, our German colleagues, people on the Security Council and I must say that in the Security Council the common opinion is quite clear : it is necessary to have a full legitimate organization to take responsibility for the security interests of all the parties.

Q. - You said you wished to see the war end quickly. Would you tell us who it is that you wish to see win the war quickly? Number two, having said that you want to take responsibility, would you go along with what now appears to be the consensus position between the British and the Americans to have UN authorization as opposed to UN administration? The Azores statement talks about UN authorization for a post-Saddam government essentially giving its blessing, its stamp of approval, to whatever system is put in place, do you insist on the UN physically administrating, something which UN bureaucracy seems reluctant to do?

THE MINISTER - Well. The first part of the question I am not going to answer because I believe you have not listened carefully to what I have said before. There is no need for me to answer the question, because you have already the answer.

The second part concerning the authorization and the organization : I believe it is a matter of principle. Legitimacy in politics is always a matter of principle. Who has the right to say "this is fair, this is unfair" ? The Security Council has the responsibility. And I believe the UN is the only one who can say "this is legitimate, and this is not legitimate". And in such a region of tensions, in such a period of tensions, we all face and we all know the risk of terrorism, the risk of proliferation. We should be very careful to take into account the fact that, if we want to be efficient, we need to be legitimate. And you don't invent legitimacy. For that, I believe, of course, the UN must be the key partner. But, of course, the UN is going to work with all the countries. And all the countries that have the experience, that are there, that are ready to help are needed to do that. And, of course, the countries that have taken the risk to go there must have a very important role, above all the rest. This is very clear in my mind. But I am talking about principles. The sources of legitimacy should be in the hands of the UN.

Q. - Do you subscribe to the view that the major factor behind the war against Iraq was oil? After all, Iraq's proven and undiscovered reserves amount to $330 billion, calculated at the current oil prices. They are the equivalent of the US gross national product. If you want to tell me that oil was not a factor, then why did the United States not attack North Korea which has declared it has nuclear weapons. If the answer again is that North Korea is hard to attack militarily, then wouldn't that give the moral justification to other countries, including Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction?

THE MINISTER - You can include many factors to explain what's going on there. I am not going to separate these factors, because I believe the key element is security. And I believe that the acceleration of the timetable on Iraq has been caused by 11 September, which changed the vision of security for the United States and made necessary something that was maybe not as urgent, and not by the means that have been used. So, I believe the security concern and the way the United States was seeing the security and stability of the world explain the current situation. The way they explained their own policy - going from disarmament, to regime change and remodelling - clearly showed that they were having security concerns.

During this period, we have seen some accusations, anathemas, going from one side to another. France has taken a very strong stand in never criticizing, never personalizing the crisis. You won't find a word in the mouth of the Foreign Minister, or the President of the French Republic against anyone, either against this country or the United States, because we do not consider that today we are opposing the United States. This is not the problem for us. The problem is how to resolve the Iraq crisis and how to manage the different situations of the world. And I think we should only aim at achieving a constructive attitude. This is, right now, a challenge for all the international community. And I don't think it is very useful to point out or to look for scapegoats in order to explain personal or political difficulties. We need to face [up to things] directly and personally, and stand by our beliefs. That is what France is doing.