REMARKS BY M. DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

FRANCE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

February 24, 2003

THE MINISTER – (...) Let me briefly tell you France's position, at this stage, on the Iraq crisis. For France, we are most definitely at the inspections stage in the framework defined by UNSCR 1441. There's the phase for the inspections with the goal supported by the entire international community: Iraq's disarmament. We consider that, on the basis of Messrs Blix and ElBaradei's latest report, there's been progress. So there's every reason to pursue, encourage the inspectors' work, concretely on the ground. (...) For these inspections to be more effective, we want to send a message in the strongest possible terms making it clear to Baghdad that it has to fulfil its obligations completely.

FIRST MEMORANDUM (FRENCH NONPAPER)

This is why we proposed, in a first memorandum circulated both in New York and to the inspectors, strengthening these inspections, i.e. increasing the resources available to the inspectors, the personnel, the number of regional offices, (...) and providing the inspectors with more equipment and technical resources such as, for example, those required to coordinate intelligence, carry out aerial surveillance – we've done this by making aircraft – two Mirage IV reconnaissance planes – available. We've also proposed the establishment of a monitoring body which could be deployed on already-inspected sites and thus guarantee they weren't used again for weapons of mass destruction programmes. For us, this strengthening has a very concrete objective: to give credibility to the expertise and ability of the inspectors to work on the ground.

SECOND MEMORANDUM

But we want to go further and this is why we're going to present today in New York a second memorandum which has two essential objectives: the first is to set timescales programme by programme. It's important to give credibility, concrete substance to the inspectors' work. And for this, in the different areas we know about – the nuclear, chemical, ballistic, biological spheres – we need to lay down concrete timescales, programme by programme. We must also specify benchmarks and criteria which will allow the inspectors to work faster, more effectively. We have here today on the table a number of examples of this. For instance, in the ballistic missiles sphere we are supporting Mr Blix's request for the destruction of the missiles [Al-Samoud] which must start by 1 March. (...)

It's important for the Iraqis to fulfil all their obligations. Firstly, on the information front, it's important for Iraq to give all the information in her possession. Secondly, it's important for the inspectors to be able concretely to verify the information on the ground. And, in this context, the list supplied by Iraq of the 83 experts who in 1991 assisted in the destruction of chemical weapons is obviously an important one. It must be made full use of in order to go back over the programmes and destruction of these different chemical weapons. And thirdly, there's the elimination and destruction of the weapons. Wherever any ballistic, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction are found, they must be destroyed.

CONFRONTING PROLIFERATION THREATS

So we have genuinely before us a tool – the inspections –, a means offered to the international community which it's very important to give credibility to and develop. Why? Because, as we all know, we are confronted with a proliferation crisis, the Iraq crisis, but going beyond Iraq, with many other proliferation threats too.

We shall, quite obviously, have to address the situation of North Korea. There are other countries in the international arena which possess large quantities of weapons of mass destruction. We can't ignore this. And it's important for the United Nations, the Security Council, to be able, through the Iraq crisis, to provide the international community with a peaceful way of achieving its goal through these inspections. In the past, we've had experience of inspections of a different order. This was the case in Ukraine and South Africa, in States which, resolutely and clearly embarking on the path to democracy, wished to cooperate with the international community. Iraq is a rather exceptional case. We are faced with a dictatorship. (...) But there are others, there are other States under dictatorships which have weapons of mass destruction. So it's especially important to find a peaceful way of inspecting and disarming these countries. (...) The international community won't have wasted its time if, by keeping its head and making dogged and determined efforts, it manages to find a method of genuinely bringing about this disarmament.

SECOND RESOLUTION/FRENCH VETO

(...) Some States today think it important to table a second resolution. We ourselves don't think it necessary. We think it isn't constructive. (...) A second resolution, today, is not required under the terms of UNSCR 1441. This is why we have said that we couldn't accept this second resolution which would plainly fall within the framework of the preparation of a military intervention. (...) Clearly, we are ready to face up to our responsibilities if, under the terms of UNSCR 1441, we were to come up against a dead end, but solely in that situation. If the inspectors tell us they can no longer work on the ground, if they tell us, in a forthcoming report, that they have reached a dead end, then we shall be in the phase of a possible second resolution, considering all the options, including a recourse to force – President Chirac has made this extremely clear – as a last extreme. For us, force can be only a last resort. But we're not at that point.

Q. – You say that you will clearly face up to your responsibilities, there will be a second resolution which will be for a military intervention in Iraq. What will France do? Will she use her veto?

THE MINISTER – At this point, there isn't a second resolution. There's a rough draft which is going to circulate in New York. There are no plans for this draft to be voted on for several weeks. Today, there clearly isn't, to my knowledge, a majority in favour of such a resolution. You are aware of the positions expressed at the 14 February meeting when we met the United Nations inspectors. They made it clear that there had been progress, and I believe that a very large majority of the international community, and in fact of Security Council members, are today keen to encourage this inspections route. As evidence, I refer you to the position voiced unanimously at the Addis Ababa meeting of the African Union's Central Organ, that expressed at the Africa-France conference, that voiced by the non-aligned States and, in fact, the one expressed by the Arab League. Today, a very large majority of countries wants the inspections to continue. Let me repeat again, were we to come up against a dead end, things could change. For the time being, we are all keen to bring about, give every chance to a peace settlement through the inspections.

Q. – (...) We get the feeling, from what the US President said, that "the die is cast". For you, is the destruction of the missiles really something positive?

THE MINISTER – For France's it's an important milestone. You can't at one and the same time ask Saddam Hussein to destroy his weapons of mass destruction, and in particular his missiles as Mr Hans Blix is doing, and not take account of what Iraq might do to comply.

(...)

Q. – This morning, Mr Jack Straw talked about a two-week time limit for a possible adoption of the second resolution you mentioned. Will the Franco-German position still be maintained.

THE MINISTER – UNSCR 1441, which is the reference for every one of us and for all the Security Council members, doesn't give any time limits or deadlines. (...) We have made it plain: we are not supporting this draft resolution for which under the terms of UNSCR 1441 there's no need. We have the framework and means to act. (...)

FRANCE/US/CRISIS MANAGEMENT/TERRORISM/UN

Q. – One of the possible consequences of this crisis would be a radical deterioration in Franco-American relations. At this stage, isn't this a variable you're taking into account?

THE MINISTER – You mustn't confuse things. On one side, there is the Iraq crisis and, on the other, the transatlantic relationship. We think it a great mistake to confuse the two. All the European countries which have been meeting here have clearly signalled their desire for the best relations with the United States. We all have a historical, cultural, political legacy of friendly relations with the United States to which we are committed. There's no question of calling this into question (...)

But we think that a premature unilateral intervention would introduce an uncertainty which would not help us achieve our goal. So we're saying that it's important, in this context, to meet, to maintain the international community's unity and cohesion. (...) The issue is very important. It's involves Iraq, of course. It involves the Middle East. It involves the way we want to manage the world and crises. Since, going beyond proliferation, there's terrorism. Going beyond terrorism, there are the regional crises. We can't today forget the threats casting deep shadows over the world. So it's important to find the strength within the international community, through the most legitimate organ, i.e. the United Nations, the depositary of that legitimacy on which the efficacy of international action depends. So it's important to take the path most likely to produce results. For France it's that of the United Nations.

(...)

Q. – Without the American pressure, you wouldn't have achieved much?

THE MINISTER – It's important to factor in all the parameters today exerting pressure on Iraq. To begin with, there's the diplomatic pressure, the pressure of all the States which have direct relations with, or can exert political pressure on Iraq and on Saddam Hussein, and, first and foremost of course, the Arab countries, and countries like Russia. Mr Primakov's visit is another wholly positive and immediate example. Let's not forget either, of course – I'm fully aware of this, and President Chirac made it very clear in an interview given to "Time Magazine" – the pressure exerted militarily by the presence of a major US deployment in the region. But there's another point too which mustn't be forgotten: the regular appointments the Security Council has made with the inspectors which make it possible to set timescales, which means that every two to three weeks the international community meets to review the progress of the inspections. This is putting tremendous pressure on Iraq. Indeed progress was made last week because of the 14 February report and this is why we're keeping up the pressure so that the forthcoming reports provide clear markers for the path ahead. And France is making concrete proposals to strengthen the inspections, improve the way the criteria and timescales are set, because we know it's important to exert pressure by setting these timescales, which also have to take account of the actual work the inspectors are doing on the ground, to ensure they are tailored to the inspectors' requirements, and this is why the second French memorandum wants to set specific timescales, programme by programme, and more clearly define the criteria one by one. The pressure exerted by holding these meetings will give us hope that the inspections will continue over the next few weeks.

Q. – Wouldn't what you say be more credible if there were French troops on the ground?

THE MINISTER – There are at present nearly 200,000 soldiers in the region, that's pressure no one can ignore, of which everyone is aware, and this why we've said clearly: what greater success for the United States, for President Bush, than to be able to hope for this huge force to return after achieving the goal set by the international community, i.e. the disarmament of Iraq, without a shot being fired, without a single death. That would be a tremendous success. There couldn't be a better example of political responsibility./.