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STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESPERSON
FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
March 11, 2003
Excerpts
Q – This morning, there was talk of differences between the British and the Americans at the UN on the draft resolution. What exactly is the situation? Are there compromises that France could support?
Indeed, this is a new development, and the future will tell whether or not it is significant, but the British have taken a position that is different from that of the Americans, who want to proceed with a vote on the resolution by the end of the week. The British, for their part, have indicated that they might envision other hypotheses.
Is this positive? What are the possibilities for compromise? I think it's too soon to tell. We've indicated that we are open to dialogue; we've indicated the red lines beyond which we won't compromise, and the areas in which there could be compromises. These red lines are very clear: the rejection of any resolution authorizing the use of force at this point, whether it be in the form of a direct authorization or a deferred authorization via an ultimatum or a mechanism of automatic authorization. We don't want automaticity in the use of force.
Q – You wouldn't accept it even for a period of two months?
We hope that what the inspectors are saying is being heeded. Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei have very clearly said they need months, with an s, and not weeks. Resolution 1248, on which the United States voted yes, calls for an interval of four months from the time Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei present their work program, which they are to do by the end of March, and the first assessment. After that, we can indeed think about a calendar, and we've said we're willing to do everything possible to reduce that four months to a somewhat shorter period, and that we're completely ready to compromise on this point. But once again, we are operating within the very clear framework of UN resolutions, resolutions 1441 and 1284.
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Q – Would France consider a unilateral action by the United States illegal?
This is still a hypothetical question because we aren't there yet; inspections are continuing and we are currently discussing within the Security Council what it would be best to do. A few countries want authorization from the Security Council to disarm Iraq by force; a majority of the Council thinks we must continue with inspections, making them more effective and trying to focus on essential tasks. Let me note that the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, expressed himself on this subject and as you know, we tend to attach the greatest possible importance to what Mr. Annan says, as he is the best qualified to make a judgment in such a case.
Q – What does France expect from the EU candidate countries?
We obviously respect their decisions on a national level. But at the European level, as candidates for the EU, we expect from them what everyone expects: I believe that someone who wants to join the European family is expected to strengthen that family and contribute to the unity of EU actions.
Q - What does France expect from the countries of the East? What is France doing to make European cohesiveness firmer from the perspective of candidate countries who are as attached to their transatlantic ties as they are to European cohesiveness?
We present arguments, we work, we are continuing our program of meetings and rapprochement. Bilateral cooperation and ministerial exchanges continue. And of course, friendship endures. There is Iraq, and there's everything else. Iraq is one of the subjects that divides Europe, but perhaps not in a lasting manner. Beyond the choice we must make in the coming days—beyond that choice—we all agree on the objective. The objective is to disarm Iraq. We are in agreement with the United States; we are in agreement with the international community. Now, at the European level, we have a particular choice that is a little hard to make, a choice that is first of all that of the members of the Security Council. It is our judgment that Europe will probably emerge, as President Chirac said yesterday, strengthened by this test. Let us not forget that Iraq has divided Europe for 12 years. What we hope is that the time will come as quickly as possible when Europe will be able to rally around common ideas, and as we wait for this moment to come, as quickly as possible, we must all roll up our sleeves and work for it.
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Q – It's quite clear that the Americans are using a mixture of threats and other things to get votes in the Security Council. Is France doing the same?
It's a good question, but the answer is quite clear. Our logic is not one of pressure. Our logic is one of respect and dialogue, in keeping with the traditions of the relationships between France and, in this case, Africa. At the France-Africa Summit in Paris a little more than two weeks ago, we were discussing Iraq and all of the African leaders present agreed on the same line. It is in this spirit that we are holding discussions with our African colleagues in the Security Council.
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Q – Was it the failure of Rambouillet that inspired France to raise the debate to the presidential level? Is Saddam Hussein invited?
Under the customary rules of the Security Council, the country whose situation is being discussed at the Security Council can always ask—and in fact that has been the case, during the most recent debates—to be represented at the Council table. Iraq has always chosen to be represented, even when the debate has been at the ministerial level, by its permanent representative in New York.
As for Rambouillet, it was indeed a process that should not serve as a precedent. And that was the point of view of the entire international community.
Q – Were the Rambouillet talks carried out under the threat of a military intervention?
Of course, but the disarmament of Iraq is also being carried out under the threat of a military intervention; as President Chirac said, it is indeed because there is military pressure that we're achieving the results that we're achieving. The parallel is a relevant one.
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