FRENCH-GERMAN-RUSSIAN MEMORANDUM ON IRAQ

FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

February 25, 2003

Q - How would you describe relations with the United States, between France and the US?

We share the same values. They are our allies.

Q - To what extent was Russia involved in the memorandum?

Russia has the same status as France or Germany. All three of us worked on the memorandum trilaterally. It is also supported by China. But China supported it afterwards when it had read the memorandum. The memorandum, on the contrary, was drawn up by France, Germany and Russia.

Q - The memorandum says that under resolution 1284, the inspectors have to present a program of work that has to be approved... In what form? A resolution?

Not as we see it. The memorandum, in our view, is exactly in line with resolutions 1284 and 1441 so there's no need for a resolution to approve it. It can be implemented without a new resolution. Its objective, I can add, is to propose concrete criteria to facilitate and provide references for disarmament. Let me repeat our démarche: initially with German support, we put forward a series of proposals to strengthen the inspections and now we're explaining how this reinforcement can lead to Iraq's complete disarmament. Our text recalls the principles: the military option is a last resort, the conditions for resorting to force have not been met at this time; the Security Council must play a central role; pressure on Iraq must be maintained. And we offer three groups of proposals: first, setting a clear program of work for the inspections. We're proposing timelines, program by program, to facilitate the inspectors' work and speed up the effective disarmament. And at each stage of the inspection program, the demands must be spelled out precisely. So the inspectors must be able to interview Iraqi experts without being recorded and in places the inspectors chose. Then we must strengthen the inspections, that was the purpose of the specific proposals on February 5: increased resources, mobile units, aerial surveillance, on-site surveillance. Lastly, setting dates for Security Council meetings with the inspectors to show that the timetable exists and is realistic. It's a tight timetable, rigorous and possible. We think that all these measures could and should preserve the unity of the Security Council and the effectiveness of Iraq's disarmament without having to spill blood.

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Q - Do you think Iraq is going to destroy its Al-Samoud missiles?

I don't think anything. I will confine myself to recalling that the minister, speaking in Brussels yesterday, answered this in his briefing. I refer you to what he said. The moment Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei say that the Al-Samouds violate the resolutions, we support what they say on this score. Our position is clear. For France, the destruction of these missiles is an important stage. One cannot at the same time ask Saddam Hussein to destroy these weapons of mass destruction, particularly these missiles, as Mr. Blix has just done, and not take into account whether Iraq does. If Iraq wishes to engage in a process of destroying these missiles, we will have to take it into account; it's an important stage, it's the real objective of the international community. Regarding the substance, we support, we uphold the inspectors' request.

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Q - How are you going to implement the memorandum since there's no vote or discussion?

I have not said there would be no discussion. I said that for the time being, we were presenting ideas, and that these ides were going to be discussed. As for the procedural form for implementing them, once again, we've not expressed a preference for any particular démarche. What matters is for these ideas to be implemented without the need for a new resolution.

Q - But who will decide about implementing them?

It's up to the inspectors first. They're the ones who decide. These are proposals for the inspectors, just like the first memorandum. The Council may be consulted at the request of the inspectors or one of the members.

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Q - How are the proposals of France, Germany and Russia different from those made on February 14? Do they add something? And what, aside from Mirage reconnaissance flights, was adopted from the earlier set of proposals you made?

You underline the fact that our two sets of proposals obey the same logic. We agree, we're following a consistent démarche. The logic consists of giving the inspections every chance; we're not in a logic of isolation, of closing doors; on the contrary we're listening, we're listening to what our partners say, including those who don't have that much faith in inspections, who think they're failing. We're listening to everybody and taking very much into account what everyone says because we're still trying to seek the unity of the Security Council. This approach is illustrated by what we're proposing today, a démarche that can unify the Security Council. We want to disarm Iraq, we want to do it quickly, and in wanting to do it together and quickly, we should normally agree on reasonable proposals. That's the objective of our proposals.

What's new in the proposals is the hierarchical listing of key unresolved disarmament questions in the context of defining the inspectors' program of work. (...) The inspections cannot be ended, Iraq's disarmament cannot be terminated if we don't know what still has to be done.

We've also put forward a proposal about tightening the timeframe of UNMOVIC and IAEA work; we're speaking, for example, of a timeframe of four months from the time the proposals are put into effect. You can see how we're proposing a tighter schedule.

Lastly, we're talking about intensifying the inspections regime, and to do this we're resubmitting some of the ideas from February 14, a few ideas differently formulated. Regarding the ideas put forward at the last Security Council meetings, some of them have already been implemented, for example overflights by U2s and Mirages; others are being considered, such as strengthening the inspections on the ground and permanent on-site monitoring; others perhaps did not elicit much comment from Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei at this time, but you'll have to ask them where we are.

Q - Will France maintain its threat about not ratifying EU membership for the eastern European countries if they continue to support a second resolution?

Let's be clear, we've never made the slightest threat. We pointed out, among other things, that the EU is not just a cash-cow and drew the attention of the candidates to a danger: we're in a process of ratification and it's delicate. (...) We're in a difficult and delicate period and anything that might potentially complicate the task of those responsible for seeing membership through and making enlargement work should in our view be avoided. It's a danger as the president has said. So it's not a threat, nor is it a change of course.

As Mr. Robertson said of the Atlantic Alliance, what's expected of candidates to an international organization—he was speaking of candidates to the Atlantic Alliance—is that they add to the unity and strength of the organization, not to its divisions. What's true for the Atlantic Alliance goes for the European Union.

Q - To go back to the US resolution. What's in it that you don't like? What do you find unacceptable in it?

We're in the process of discussing and analyzing this resolution. We got it last night. I've no immediate official reaction to the document today. At this time our sole position is that stated last night by the president; we still consider as the minister said yesterday, that a new resolution isn't necessary.

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Q - About the inspectors. What was their initial reaction in the contacts between France and the inspectors when the memorandum was presented?

We have regular contacts and are working on the basis of the resolutions that give the inspectors their mandates, that is 1441 and 1284. Our proposals are being studied precisely to respond to the needs of the inspectors who have to present soon, under the resolutions, a program of work by the end of March. Our objective, I repeat, is to speed up the program of work insofar as possible since a program is required, a timetable is already indicated in resolution 1284, and the logic of our proposal is to tighten this timeframe as well.

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Q - About the tightened timetable. You mentioned a four-month delay? It's not in the memorandum?

Yes it is, 120 days.

Q - Will Saddam Hussein's statements in his interview with CBS be considered an answer or is France waiting for a real answer?

We're not especially punctilious but we expect a clear answer. So far, that's not happened, and I'm not sure that the CBS interview constitutes an answer, far from it. The Iraqi authorities have said they would announce their position. They didn't say that these decisions would be given in the course of an interview with CBS.