Volume 1, Issue 2
May 2002

Iraq's Pointed Questions

By Kelly Motz

In early May, Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri met for the second time in two months with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan - the purpose being to discuss renewed UN weapon inspections in Iraq. The meetings produced no agreement, but they did illuminate the widening chasm between what Iraq wants and what the United Nations can give.

Iraq's goals in calling the meetings did not seem to be disarmament. Instead, Iraq appears to want to refocus the world's attention away from the fact that it has not disarmed. In addition, Iraq would like to ensure that any future inspection regime will contain enough loopholes to make it ineffective.

Back in March, the Iraqis laid out their agenda in a series of "nineteen questions," which Sabri handed to Annan in their first meeting. The questions boil down to four essential points. First, the Iraqis asked the UN to state "what are the ... remaining questions to be clarified through inspections [and] how much time is needed ... ?" The question reveals a desire to shift the burden of proof. Currently, Iraq must prove it has disarmed. Instead, Iraq wants to make the UN inspectors prove it has not, a far more difficult task. In addition, Iraq wants a limited time-frame for inspections, which would put a premium on stalling. Iraq has a successful record of foot-dragging, making it unlikely that inspectors will find much in a limited time period.

Iraq also asked whether the inspections would respect Iraq's "sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity." Translated, this means that Iraq is seeking a promise that inspections will not be confrontational or intrusive. Iraq has long used claims of sovereignty to try to hamstring inspections, as it did in February 1998, when it locked inspectors out of large areas that it deemed "presidential sites."

Third, the Iraqis asked, "how could US and UK inspectors fulfill a neutral international mandate?" What Iraq is really asking for here is the right to bar US and UK inspectors, on the theory that they are biased. Attempts by Iraq to dictate the composition of UN inspection teams led to a series of confrontations and inspection stoppages in 1997 and 1998, before Iraq evicted the inspectors altogether. Now, the UN has unfettered power to name inspectors, but Iraq wants a veto over inspectors it does not like. Once more, Iraq is trying to shift the debate away from its disarmament obligations to UN politics.

The fourth major question the Iraqis asked was whether "threats to invade Iraq and to change the national government by force" violate international law, and whether "one permanent member of the Security Council" is entitled to interpret UN resolutions unilaterally. Translated, this means that Iraq wants some kind of UN promise that the United States will not invade. By throwing such a question into the UN Security Council, Iraq hopes its friends there can pressure America into military forbearance as a price for inspections.

The nineteen questions reveal that Saddam Hussein really has not changed his tactics since the inspections began in 1991. Indeed, one of the remarkable things about Iraq's protracted dealings with the United Nations has been Saddam's steadiness of purpose.

If Saddam has not changed, what has? The answer may lie in the UN's determination to deny Iraq what it seeks. The present rules are set down in UN Resolution 1284. It requires that Iraq "cooperate fully" for 120 days in fulfilling disarmament tasks specified by the inspectors in their "work programs" in order to have sanctions suspended. This resolution is weaker than its predecessor, Resolution 687, which required Iraq to fully, finally and completely disclose its program, which the inspectors would then verify and destroy or render harmless, all before sanctions could be removed.

Resolution 1284 nevertheless has teeth. It guarantees the inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" to any place, person or document in Iraq and puts no limit on the time it will take to complete inspections. It neither promises non-confrontational inspections nor gives Iraq any say over who the inspectors will be. In addition, it keeps the inspectors under the wing of the Security Council, not the Secretary General, who has no supervisory authority over the inspections. Thus, Iraq's meetings with the Secretary General are not really negotiations. The Secretary General can only inform Iraq that it must disarm; he cannot decide how or to what extent Iraq will comply with Security Council resolutions. Iraq's decision to approach the more sympathetic Secretary General is mainly an effort to circumvent Resolution 1284.

Iraq's questions reveal that it is still not ready to let the inspectors do their job. Clearly, Iraq wants the Secretary General to ease the disarmament requirements further. To put all this maneuvering in perspective, one should remember that Saddam Hussein could have ended the embargo at any time in the past ten years by giving up his weapon programs, but has preferred to make Iraq's population suffer instead. The question now is whether this strategy will succeed.